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In this paper we explore a  new  theory of discourse  structure  that  stresses the  role  of purpose  and 
processing in discourse.  In this theory, discourse structure is composed of three separate but interre- 
lated components: the structure of the sequence of utterances (called the linguistic structure), a struc- 
ture  of  purposes  (called  the  intentional  structure),  and  the  state  of  focus  of  attention  (called  the 
attentional state).  The linguistic structure consists of segments of the discourse into which the utter- 
ances  naturally  aggregate.  The  intentional  structure  captures  the  discourse-relevant  purposes, 
expressed in each of the linguistic segments as well as relationships among them.  The attentional state 
is an abstraction of the focus of attention of the participants as the discourse unfolds.  The attentional 
state, being dynamic, records the objects, properties, and relations that are salient at each point of the 
discourse.  The distinction among these components is essential to provide an adequate explanation of 
such discourse phenomena as cue phrases, referring expressions, and interruptions. 
The theory of attention,  intention,  and aggregation of utterances is illustrated in the paper with a 
number of example discourses.  Various properties of discourse are described, and explanations for the 
behavior of cue phrases, referring expressions, and interruptions are explored. 
This  theory  provides  a  framework  for  describing  the  processing  of  utterances  in  a  discourse. 
Discourse processing requires recognizing how the utterances of the discourse aggregate into segments, 
recognizing the intentions expressed in the discourse and the relationships among intentions, and track- 
ing  the  discourse  through  the  operation  of the  mechanisms associated  with  attentional  state.  This 
processing description specifies in these recognition tasks the role of information from the discourse 
and from the participants' knowledge of the domain. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  presents  the  basic  elements  of  a  computa- 
tional  theory  of  discourse  structure  that  simpfifies  and 
expands  upon  previous  work.  By  specifying  the  basic 
units  a  discourse  comprises and the  ways in  which  they 
can  relate,  a  proper  account  of  discourse  structure 
provides the  basis for an account of discourse  meaning. 
An  account  of  discourse  structure  also  plays  a  central 
role  in  language  processing  because  it  stipulates 
constraints on those portions of a discourse to which any 
given utterance in the discourse must be related. 
An account of discourse  structure is closely related to 
two  questions:  What  individuates  a  discourse?  What 
makes  it  coherent?  That  is,  faced  with  a  sequence  of 
utterances, how does one know whether they constitute a 
single discourse, several (perhaps interleaved) discourses, 
or none?  As we develop it, the theory of discourse struc- 
ture  will  be  seen  to  be  intimately  connected  with  two 
nonlinguistic  notions:  intention  and attention.  Attention 
is  an  essential  factor  in  explicating  the  processing  of 
utterances in discourse.  Intentions play a primary role in 
explaining  discourse  structure,  defining  discourse  coher- 
ence,  and providing  a  coherent  conceptualization  of the 
term "discourse" itself. 
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The theory is a further development and integration of 
two  lines  of  research:  work  on  focusing  in  discourse 
(Grosz  1978a,  1978b,  1981)  and  more recent  work on 
intention  recognition  in  discourse  (Sidner  and  Israel 
1981;  Sidner  1983;  1985;  Allen  1983,  Litman  1985; 
Pollack  1986).  Our  goal  has  been  to  generalize  these 
constructs  properly  to  a  wide  range  of  discourse  types. 
Grosz (1978a)  demonstrated that the notions of focusing 
and  task  structure  are  necessary  for  understanding  and 
producing  task-oriented  dialogue.  One  of  the  main 
generalizations  of  previous  work  will  be  to  show  that 
discourses  are  generally  in  some  sense  "task-oriented," 
but the kinds of "tasks" that can be engaged in are quite 
varied -  some are physical,  some mental, others linguis- 
tic.  Consequently,  the  term  "task"  is  misleading;  we 
therefore  will  use  the  more  general  terminology  of 
intentions  (e.g., when speaking of discourse purposes) for 
most of what we say. 
Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is 
a composite of three distinct but interacting components: 
•  the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the 
discourse; 
•  a structure of intentions; 
•  an attentional state. 
The  distinction  among these  components  is  essential  to 
an explanation of interruptions  (see Section 5), as well as 
to  explanations  of  the  use  of  certain  types  of  referring 
expressions  (see  Section  4.2)  and  various  other 
expressions that affect discourse segmentation and struc- 
ture  (see  Section  6).  Most  related  work  on  discourse 
structure  (including  Reichman-Adar  1984,  Linde  1979, 
Linde  and  Goguen  1978,  Cohen  1983)  fails  to  distin- 
guish  among  some  (or,  in  some  cases,  all)  of  these 
components.  As a  result,  significant  generalizations  are 
lost,  and  the  computational  mechanisms  proposed  are 
more complex than  necessary.  By carefully distinguish- 
ing these components, we are able to account for signif- 
icant  observations in this related work while  simplifying 
both  the  explanations  given  and  computational  mech- 
anisms used. 
In addition  to explicating these linguistic  phenomena, 
the theory provides an overall framework within which to 
answer  questions  about  the  relevance  of  various 
segments of discourse  to one another and to the  overall 
purposes of the  discourse  participants.  Various  proper- 
ties  of  the  intentional  component  have  implications  for 
research  in  natural-language  processing  in  general.  In 
particular,  the  intentions  that  underlie  discourse  are  so 
diverse that approaches to discourse coherence based on 
selecting discourse relationships from a fixed set of alter- 
native  rhetorical  patterns  (e.g.,  Hobbs  1979,  Mann  and 
Thompson 1983, Reichman 1981)  are unlikely to suffice. 
The  intentional  structure  introduced  in  this  paper 
depends instead on a small number of structural relations 
that can hold between intentions.  This study also reveals 
several problems  that  must  be  confronted  in  expanding 
speech-act-related  theories  (e.g.,  Allen  and  Perrault 
1980,  Cohen  and  Levesque  1980,  Allen  1983)  from 
coverage of individual utterances to coverage of extended 
sequences of utterances in discourse. 
Although  a  definition  of discourse  must await further 
development of the theory presented in this paper, some 
properties of the phenomena we want to explain must be 
specified now.  In particular,  we take  a  discourse  to be a 
piece of language behavior that typically involves multi- 
ple  utterances  and  multiple  participants.  A  discourse 
may be produced by one or more of these participants as 
speakers  or  writers;  the  audience  may comprise  one  or 
more of the  participants  as hearers  or readers.  Because 
in  multi-party  conversations  more  than  one  participant 
may  speak  (or  write)  different  utterances  within  a 
segment,  the  terms speaker and  hearer  do  not  differen- 
tiate the  unique  roles that the participants  maintain in  a 
segment  of  a  conversation.  We  will  therefore  use  the 
terms initiating  conversational  participant  (ICP)  and  other 
conversational  participant(s)  (OCP) to distinguish the initi- 
ator of  a  discourse  segment  from its  other  participants. 
The  ICP  speaks  (or  writes)  the  first  utterance  of  a 
segment, but an OCP may be the speaker of some subse- 
quent utterances.  By speaking of ICPs and OCPs, we can 
highlight  the purposive aspect of discourse.  We will use 
the  terms  speaker  and  hearer  only  when  the  particular 
speaking/hearing activity is important for the point being 
made. 
In  most  of  this  paper,  we  will  be  concerned  with 
developing  an  abstract  model  of  discourse  structure;  in 
particular, the definitions of the components will abstract 
away  from  the  details  of  the  discourse  participants. 
Whether  one  constructs  a  computer  system  that  can 
participate  in  a  discourse  (i.e.,  one  that  is  a  language 
user)  or defines  a  psychological theory of language  use, 
the  task  will  require  the  appropriate  projection  of  this 
abstract  model  onto  properties  of  a  language  user,  and 
specification of additional details (e.g., specifying memo- 
ry for linguistic structure, means for encoding attentional 
state,  and  appropriate  representations  of  intentional 
structure).  We do, however, address ourselves directly to 
certain processing issues that are essential to the compu- 
tational validity of the [abstract] model and to its utiliza- 
tion  for  a  language-processing  system  or  psychological 
theory. 
Finally, it is important to note that although discourse 
meaning  is  a  significant,  unsolved  problem,  we  will  not 
address it in this paper.  An adequate theory of discourse 
meaning  needs  to  rest  at  least  partially  on  an  adequate 
theory of discourse structure.  Our concern is with provid- 
ing the latter. 
The  next  section  examines  the  basic  theory  of 
discourse  structure  and  presents an overview of each of 
the  components  of  discourse  structure.  Section  3 
analyzes  two  sample  discourses  -  a  written  text  and  a 
fragment of  task-oriented  dialogue  -  from the  perspec- 
tive of the  theory being developed;  these  two  examples 
are also used to illustrate various points in the remainder 
of  the  paper.  Section  4  investigates  various  processing 
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issues that the theory raises.  The following two sections 
describe  the  role  of the  discourse  structure  components 
in  explaining  various  properties  of  discourse,  thereby 
corroborating  the  necessity  of  distinguishing  among  its 
three components.  Section 7 describes the generalization 
from utterance-level to discourse-level intentions,  estab- 
lishes certain properties of the latter, and contrasts them 
with  the  rhetorical  relations  of  alternative  theories. 
Finally,  Section  8  poses  a  number  of  outstanding 
research questions suggested by the theory. 
2  THE BASIC THEORY 
Discourse  structure  is  a  composite  of  three  interacting 
constituents:  a  linguistic  structure,  an  intentional  struc- 
ture,  and  an  attentional  state.  These three  constituents 
of discourse  structure  deal with  different  aspects  of the 
utterances in a discourse.  Utterances -  the actual saying 
or writing of particular sequences of phrases and clauses 
-  are the linguistic structure's basic elements.  Intentions 
of a  particular  sort  and  a  small number of relationships 
between  them  provide  the  basic  elements  of  the  inten- 
tional  structure.  Attentional  state  contains  information 
about  the  objects,  properties,  relations,  and  discourse 
intentions  that are most salient at any given  :point.  It is 
an abstraction of the focus of attention of the discourse 
participants;  it  serves  to  summarize  information  from 
previous  utterances  crucial  for  processing  subsequent 
ones,  thus  obviating  the  need  for  keeping  a  complete 
history of the discourse. 
Together the three constituents  of discourse  structure 
supply the  information  needed  by the  CPs  to determine 
how  an  individual  utterance  fits  with  the  rest  of  the 
discourse -  in essence, enabling them to figure out why it 
was  said  and  what  it  means.  The  context  provided  by 
these constituents  also forms the basis for certain expec- 
tations about what is to come; these expectations play a 
role  in  accommodating  new  utterances.  The  attentional 
state serves an  additional  purpose:  namely, it furnishes 
the means for actually using the information in the other 
two  structures  in  generating  and  interpreting  individual 
utterances. 
2.1  LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 
The  first component  of discourse  structure  is  the  struc- 
ture  of  the  sequence  of  utterances  that  comprise  a 
discourse. 1 Just  as  the  words  in  a  single  sentence  form 
constituent  phrases,  the  utterances  in  a  discourse  are 
naturally  aggregated into discourse segments.  The utter- 
ances  in  a  segment,  like  the  words  in  a  phrase,  serve 
particular roles with respect to that segment. In addition, 
the  discourse  segments,  like  the  phrases,  fulfill  certain 
functions with respect to the overall discourse.  Although 
two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse 
segment,  it  is  also  common  for  two  consecutive  utter- 
ances  to be in different  segments.  It is also possible for 
two utterances that are nonconsecutive to be in the same 
segment. 
The  factoring  of  discourses  into  segments  has  been 
observed across a  wide range of discourse  types.  Grosz 
(1978a)  showed  this  for  task-oriented  dialogues.  Linde 
(1979)  found  it  valid  for  descriptions  of  apartments; 
Linde  and  Goguen  (1978)  describe  such  structuring  in 
the  Watergate  transcripts.  Reichman-Adar  (1984) 
observed it in informal debates, explanations,  and thera- 
peutic discourse.  Cohen (1983)  found similar structures 
in  essays  in  rhetorical  texts.  Polanyi  and  Scha  (1986) 
discuss this feature of narratives. 
Although  different researchers with  different theories 
have  examined  a  variety  of  discourse  types  and  found 
discourse-level  segmentation,  there  has  been  very  little 
investigation of the extent of agreement about where the 
segment boundaries lie.  There have been no psycholog- 
ical  studies  of  the  consistency  of  recognition  of  section 
boundaries.  However, Mann  (Mann  et  al.  1975)  asked 
several  people  to  segment  a  set  of  dialogues.  He  has 
reported  [personal  communication]  that  his  subjects 
segmented  the  discourses  approximately the  same;  their 
disagreements were about utterances at the boundaries of 
segments. 2  Several  studies  of  spontaneously  produced 
discourses provide additional evidence of the existence of 
segment  boundaries,  as  well  as  suggesting  some  of  the 
linguistic cues available for detecting boundaries.  Chafe 
(1979,  1980)  found  differences  in  pause  lengths  at 
segment  boundaries.  Butterworth  (1975)  found  speech 
rate  differences  that  correlated  with  segments;  speech 
rate is slower at start of a segment than toward the end. 
The  linguistic  structure  consists  of  the  discourse 
segments  and  an  embedding  relationship  that  can  hold 
between them.  As we discuss  in Sections  2.2  and  5,  the 
embedding  relationships  are  a  surface  reflection  of 
relationships among elements of the intentional structure. 
It is important to recognize that the linguistic structure is 
not strictly decompositional.  An individual segment may 
include  a  combination  of  subsegments  and  utterances 
only  in  that  segment  (and  not  members  of  any  of  its 
embedded subsegments). Both of the examples in Section 
3 exhibit such nonstrict decompositionality.  Because the 
linguistic structure is not strictly decompositional, various 
properties of the discourse  (most notably the intentional 
structure)  are functions of properties of individual utter- 
ances and properties of segments. 
There is a  two-way interaction  between the discourse 
segment  structure  and  the  utterances  constituting  the 
discourse:  linguistic  expressions  can be used  to  convey 
information  about  the  discourse  structure;  conversely, 
the  discourse  structure  constrains  the  interpretation  of 
expressions  (and  hence  affects what  a  speaker says and 
how a hearer will interpret what is said).  Not surprising- 
ly,  linguistic  expressions  are  among  the  primary indica- 
tors of discourse segment boundaries.  The explicit use of 
certain  words  and  phrases  (e.g.,  in  the first place)  and 
more subtle cues,  such as intonation  or changes in tense 
and  aspect,  are  included  in  the  repertoire  of  linguistic 
devices that function, wholly or in part, to indicate these 
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boundaries  (Grosz  1978a, Reichman-Adar  1984,  Cohen 
1983,  Polanyi  and  Scha  1983,  Hirschberg  and  Pierre- 
humbert  1986).  Reichman (1981) discusses some words 
that function in this way and coined the term clue words. 
We  will  use  the  term  cue  phrases  to  generalize  on  her 
observation as well as many others because each one of 
these  devices  cue  the  hearer  to  some  change  in  the 
discourse structure. 
As  discussed  in  Section  6,  these  linguistic  boundary 
markers can be divided according to whether they explic- 
itly indicate changes in the intentional structure or in the 
attentional state of the discourse.  The differential use of 
these  linguistic  markers  provides  one  piece  of  evidence 
for  considering  these  two  components  to  be  distinct. 
Because  these  linguistic  devices  function  explicitly  as 
indicators  of  discourse  structure,  it  becomes  clear  that 
they  are  best  seen  as  providing  information  at  the 
discourse  level,  and  not  at  the  sentence  level;  hence, 
certain kinds of questions  (e.g.,  about their  contribution 
to the truth conditions of an individual sentence)  do not 
make  sense.  For  example,  in  the  utterance  Incidentally, 
Jane swims every day,  the  incidentally indicates  an inter- 
ruption of the main flow of discourse rather than affect- 
ing  in  any  way  the  meaning  of Jane  swims  every  day. 
Jane's swimming every day could hardly be fortuitous. 
Just  as  linguistic  devices  affect  structure,  so  the 
discourse  segmentation  affects  the  interpretation  of 
linguistic  expressions  in  a  discourse.  Referring 
expressions  provide the  primary example  of this  effect.  3 
The  segmentation  of  discourse  constrains  the  use  of 
referring  expressions  by  delineating  certain  points  at 
which  there  is  a  significant  change  in  what  entities 
(objects,  properties,  or  relations)  are  being  discussed. 
For example, there are different constraints on the use of 
pronouns  and  reduced  definite-noun  phrases  within  a 
segment  than  across  segment  boundaries.  While 
discourse  segmentation  is  obviously not  the  only factor 
governing the use of referring expressions, it is an impor- 
tant one. 
2.2  INTENTIONAL STRUCTURE 
A  rather straightforward property of discourses, namely, 
that  they  (or,  more  accurately, those  who participate  in 
them) have an overall purpose, turns out to play a funda- 
mental  role  in  the  theory  of  discourse  structure.  In 
particular, some of the purposes that underlie discourses, 
and  their  component  segments,  provide  the  means  of 
individuating  discourses  and  of distinguishing  discourses 
that  are  coherent  from  those  that  are  not.  These 
purposes  also  make  it  possible  to  determine  when  a 
sequence  of  utterances  comprises  more  than  one 
discourse. 
Although typically the participants in a  discourse may 
have more than one aim in participating in the discourse 
(e.g.,  a  story  may  entertain  its  listeners  as  well  as 
describe an event; an argument may establish a  person's 
brilliance  as  well  as  convince  someone  that  a  claim  or 
allegation is  true),  we  distinguish  one of these  purposes 
as foundational to the discourse. We will refer to it as the 
discourse purpose  (DP). From an intuitive perspective, the 
discourse purpose is the intention that underlies engaging 
in the particular discourse.  This intention provides both 
the reason a discourse (a linguistic act), rather than some 
other  action,  is  being  performed  and  the  reason  the 
particular  content  of  this  discourse  is  being  conveyed 
rather  than  some  other  information.  For  each  of  the 
discourse segments, we can also single out one intention 
-  the discourse  segment purpose  (DSP).  From an intuitive 
standpoint,  the  DSP  specifies  how this  segment  contrib- 
utes  to  achieving  the  overall  discourse  purpose.  The 
assumption  that  there  are  single  such  intentions  will  in 
the  end  prove  too  strong.  However,  this  assumption 
allows  us  to describe  the  basic theory more clearly. We 
must  leave  to future  research  (and  a  subsequent  paper) 
the  exploration and  discussion of the  complications that 
result from relaxing this assumption. 
Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds 
of intentions that lead to initiating a  discourse. One kind 
might include intentions to speak in a certain language or 
to utter certain words.  Another might include intentions 
to amuse or to impress.  The kinds of intentions that can 
serve  as  discourse  purposes  or  discourse  segment 
purposes  are  distinguished  from other  intentions  by the 
fact  that  they  are  intended  to  be  recognized  (cf.  Allen 
and  Perrault  1980,  Sidner  1985),  whereas  other 
intentions  are  private;  that is,  the  recognition of the  DP 
or  DSP  is  essential  to  its  achieving  its  intended  effect. 
Discourse  purposes  and  discourse  segment  purposes 
share this property with certain utterance-level intentions 
that  Grice  (1969)  uses  in  defining  utterance  meaning 
(see Section 7). 
It  is  important  to  distinguish  intentions  that  are 
intended to be recognized from other kinds of intentions 
that  are  associated  with  discourse.  Intentions  that  are 
intended  to  be  recognized achieve  their  intended  effect 
only  if  the  intention  is  recognized.  For  example,  a 
compliment achieves its intended effect only if the inten- 
tion to compliment is recognized; in contrast, a scream of 
boo  typically  achieves  its  intended  effect  (scaring  the 
hearer) without the hearer having to recognize the speak- 
er's intention. 
Some intention that is  private  and not intended to be 
recognized may be the primary motivation for an ICP to 
begin  a  discourse.  For example,  the  ICP may intend to 
impress  someone  or  may  plan  to  teach  someone.  In 
neither case is the ICP's intention necessarily intended to 
be  recognized.  Quite  the  opposite  may be  true  in  the 
case of impressing,  as the ICP may not want the OCP to 
be  aware of his intention.  When teaching,  the ICP may 
not care whether the OCP knows the ICP is teaching him 
or  her.  Thus,  the  intention  that  motivates  the  ICP  to 
engage in  a  discourse  may be  private.  By contrast,  the 
discourse  segment  purpose  is  always  intended  to  be 
recognized. 
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DPs  and  DSPs  are  basically  the  same  sorts  of 
intentions. If an intention is a DP, then its satisfaction is a 
main  purpose  of  the  discourse,  whereas  if  it  is  a  DSP, 
"then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the 
DP.  The  following are  some  of the  types of intentions 
that could serve as DP/DSPs, followed by one example of 
each type. 
1.  Intend that some agent intend to perform some phys- 
ical task.  Example: Intend that Ruth  intend to fix the 
flat tire. 
2.  Intend that some agent believe  some fact.  Example: 
Intend that Ruth believe the campfire has started. 
3.  Intend that some agent believe that one fact supports 
another.  Example: lntend that Ruth  believe the smell 
of smoke provides evidence that the campfire is started. 
4.  Intend that  some  agent  intend  to  identify  an  object 
(existing  physical  object,  imaginary  object,  plan, 
event,  event  sequence).  Example:  Intend  that  Ruth 
intend to identify my bicycle. 
5.  Intend  that  some  agent  know  some  property  of  an 
object.  Example: Intend that Ruth know that my bicy- 
cle has a flat tire. 
We  have  identified  two  structural  relations  that  play 
an  important  role  in  discourse  structure:  dominance  and 
satisfaction-precedence.  An  action  that  satisfies  one 
intention,  say DSP1,  may be  intended to provide part of 
the  satisfaction of another,  say DSP2.  When this  is  the 
case,  we  will  say  that  DSP1  contributes  to  DSP2; 
conversely,  we  will  say  that  DSP2  dominates  DSP1  (or 
DSP2  DOM  DSP1).  The  dominance  relation  invokes  a 
partial ordering on DSPs that we will refer to as the domi- 
nance hierarchy.  For some discourses, including task-or- 
iented  ones,  the  order  in  which  the  DSPs  are  satisfied 
may be significant, as well as being intended to be recog- 
nized.  We will  say that DSP1  satisfaction-precedes DSP2 
(or,  DSP1  SP  DSP2)  whenever  DSP1  must  be  satisfied 
before DSP2. 4 
Any of the  intentions  on the  preceding list  could be 
either  a  DP or a  DSP.  Furthermore,  a  given instance  of 
any  one  of  them  could  contribute  to  another,  or  to  a 
different,  instance  of the  same  type.  For  example,  the 
intention  that  someone  intend  to  identify  some  object 
might  dominate  several  intentions  that  she  or  he  know 
some  property of that  object;  likewise,  the  intention  to 
get  someone  to  believe  some  fact  might  dominate  a 
number  of  contributing  intentions  that  that  person 
believe other facts. 
As the above list makes clear, the range of intentions 
that  can  serve  as  discourse,  or  discourse  segment, 
purposes  is  open-ended  (cf.  Wittgenstein  1953:  para- 
graph 23), much like the range of intentions that underlie 
more general purposeful action. There is  no finite list  of 
discourse purposes,  as  there  is,  say, of syntactic catego- 
ries.  It remains an unresolved research question whether 
there is a finite description of the open-ended set of such 
intentions.  However,  even  if  there  were  finite 
descriptions,  there  would  still  be  no  finite  list  of 
intentions  from  which  to  choose.  Thus,  a  theory  of 
discourse  structure  cannot  depend  on  choosing  the 
DP/DSPs  from  a  fixed  list  (cf.  Reichman-Adar  1984, 
Schank et al.  1982, Mann and Thompson 1983), nor on 
the  particulars  of  individual  intentions.  Although  the 
particulars  of individual intentions,  like  a  wide  range  of 
common sense  knowledge,  are  crucial  to  understanding 
any discourse,  such particulars  cannot serve as the basis 
for determining discourse structure. 
What  is  essential  for discourse  structure  is  that  such 
intentions bear certain kinds of structural relationships to 
one  another.  Since  the  CPs can  never know the  whole 
set of intentions that,might serve as DP/DSPs, what they 
must  recognize  is  the  relevant  structural  relationships 
among intentions.  Although there is an infinite  number 
of intentions,  there  are only a  small number of relations 
relevant  to  discourse  structure  that  can  hold  between 
them. 
In this paper we distinguish between the determination 
of the  DSP  and the  recognition  of it.  We  use  the  term 
determination to refer to a  semantic-like  notion,  namely, 
the complete specification of what is intended by whom; 
we  use  the  term  recognition  to  refer  to  a  processing 
notion,  namely,  the  processing  that  leads  a  discourse 
participant  to  identify  what  the  intention  is.  These  are 
obviously  related  concepts;  the  same  information  that 
determines a DSP may be used by an OCP to recognize it. 
However,  some  questions  are  relevant  to  only  one  of 
them.  For example,  the  question of when the  informa- 
tion  becomes  available  is  not  relevant  to  determination 
but  is  crucial  to  recognition.  An  analogous  distinction 
has  been  drawn  with  respect  to  sentence  structure;  the 
parse tree (determination) is differentiated from the pars- 
ing process (recognition) that produces the tree. 
2.3  ATTENTIONAL STATE 
The  third  component  of  discourse  structure,  the  atten- 
tional state, is an abstraction of the participants' focus of 
attention as their discourse unfolds.  The attentional state 
is a  property of the discourse itself,  not of the discourse 
participants.  It  is  inherently  dynamic,  recording  the 
objects, properties,  and relations  that are  salient  at each 
point in the  discourse.  The attentional  state  is  modeled 
by a  set of focus spaces;  changes in attentional  state  are 
modeled  by  a  set  of  transition  rules  that  specify  the 
conditions for adding  and  deleting  spaces.  We  call  the 
collection of focus spaces  available  at  any one  time  the 
focusing structure and the process of manipulating spaces 
focusing. 
The  focusing  process  associates  a  focus  space  with 
each discourse segment; this space contains those entities 
that  are  salient  -  either  because  they  have  been 
mentioned  explicitly  in  the  segment  or  because  they 
became  salient  in  the  process  of  producing or  compre- 
hending the utterances in the segmfnt (as in the original 
work on focusing:  Grosz  1978a).  The focus space  also 
includes the DSP; the inclusion of the purpose reflects the 
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fact that the  CPs are focused not only on what they are 
talking about, but also on why they are talking about it. 
To  understand  the  attentional  state  component  of 
discourse structure,  it is important not to confuse it with 
two  other concepts.  First,  the  attentional  state  compo- 
nent is not equivalent  to cognitive state, but is only one 
of its  components.  Cognitive  state  is  a  richer  structure, 
one that includes  at least the knowledge, beliefs, desires, 
and intentions of an agent, as well as the cognitive corre-' 
lates  of  the  attentional  state  as  modeled  in  this  paper. 
Second,  although  each  focus  space  contains  a  DSP,  the 
focus structure does not include  the intentional  structure 
as a whole. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the focusing structure, in addi- 
tion to modeling attentional  state, serves during process- 
ing to coordinate the linguistic and intentional structures. 
The discourse segments (to the left of the figure) are tied 
to focus spaces (drawn vertically down the middle of the 
figure).  The focusing structure is a stack.  Information in 
lower spaces is usually  accessible from higher  ones  (but 
less so than the information in the higher spaces); we use 
a line with intersecting hash marks to denote when this is 
not the case.  Subscripted terms are used to indicate the 
relevant contents of the focus spaces because the spaces 
contain  representations  of entities  (i.e.,  objects,  proper- 
ties, and relations) and not linguistic expressions. 
Part one of Figure  1 shows the state of focusing when 
discourse segment DS2 is being processed.  Segment DS1 
gave rise to FS1  and  had  as its discourse  purpose DSP  I. 
The  properties,  objects,  relations,  and  purpose  repres- 
ented in FS1  are accessible but less salient than those in 
FS2.  DS2 yields a  focus space that is stacked relative to 
FSl because DSP 1 of DSl dominates DS2's DSP, DSP  2.  As 
a result of the relationship between FS1  and FS2, reduced 
noun  phrases will  be interpreted  differently in DS2  than 
in DS1.  For example, if some red balls exist in the world 
one of which  is represented  in DS2  and  another in FS1, 
then the red ball used in DS2 will be understood to mean 
the  particular  red  ball  that  is  represented  in  DS2.  If, 
however, there is also a  green truck (in the world) and it 
is represented only in FS1, the green truck uttered in DS2 
will be understood as referring to that green truck. 
Part two of Figure  1 shows the state of focusing when 
segment DS3  is  being processed.  FS2  has been popped 
from the stack and FS3  has been pushed onto it because 
the  DSP  of DS3,  DSP3,  is dominated  solely by DSP  1,  not 
by  DSP  2.  In  this  example,  the  intentional  structure 
includes only dominance  relationships,  although,  it may, 
in  general,  also include  satisfaction-precedence  relation- 
ships. 
The stacking of focus spaces reflects the relative sali- 
ence of the entities in each space during the correspond- 
ing  segment's  portion  of  the  discourse.  The  stack 
relationships  arise  from  the  ways  in  which  the  various 
DSPs  relate;  information  about  such  relationships  is 
represented in the dominance hierarchy (depicted on the 
right in the figure).  The spaces in Figure  1 aresnapshots 
illustrating  the  results  of a  sequence  of operations,  such 
as  pushes  onto  and  pops  from a  stack.  A  push  occurs 
when the DSP for a  new segment contributes to the DSP 
for the  immediately preceding  segment.  When  the  DSP 
contributes  to  some  intention  higher  in  the  dominance 
hierarchy, several focus spaces are popped from the stack 
before  the new one is inserted. 
Two essential properties of the  focusing structure  are 
now clear.  First, the focusing structure is parasitic upon 
the  intentional  structure,  in  the  sense  that  the  relation- 
ships  among  DSPs  determine  pushes  and  pops.  Note 
however,  that  the  relevant operation  may sometimes be 
indicated  in  the  language  itself.  For  example,  the  cue 
word first  often indicates  the  start  of  a  segment  whose 
DSP  contributes  to  the  DSP  of  the  preceding  segment. 
Second,  the  focusing  structure,  like  the  intentional  and 
linguistic  structures,  evolves  as  the  discourse  proceeds. 
None of them exists a priori.  Even in those rare cases in 
which an ICP has a  complete plan for the discourse prior 
to  uttering  a  single  word,  the  intentional  structure  is 
constructed by the CPs as the discourse progresses.  This 
discourse-time  construction  of  the  intentional  structure 
may be more obviously true for speakers and hearers of 
spoken  discourse  than  for  readers  and  writers  of  texts, 
but, even for the writer, the intentional structure is devel- 
oped as the text is being written. 
Figure  1  illustrates  some  fundamental  distinctions 
between  the  intentional  and  attentional  components  of 
discourse  structure.  First,  the  dominance  hierarchy 
provides,  among other  things,  a  complete record  of the 
discourse-level  intentions  and  their  dominance  (as  well 
as, when relevant, satisfaction-precedence)  relationships, 
whereas the focusing structure at any one time can essen- 
tially  contain  only  information  that  is  relevant  to 
purposes  in  a  portion  of  the  dominance  hierarchy. 
Second,  at the  conclusion  of a  discourse,  if it completes 
normally, the focus stack will be empty, while the inten- 
tional  structure  will  have  been  fully constructed.  Third, 
when  the  discourse  is  being  processed,  only  the  atten- 
tional  state  can constrain  the  interpretation  of referring 
expressions directly. 
We  can  now  also  clarify  some  misinterpretations  of 
focus-space  diagrams  and  task  structure  in  our  earlier 
work (Grosz 1978a,  1981,  1974).  The focus-space hier- 
archies in that work are best seen as representing  atten- 
tional state. The task structure was used in two ways: 
1.  to represent common knowledge about the task; 
2.  as a  special case of the intentional structure we posit 
in this paper. 
Although the same representational scheme was used for 
encoding the  focus-space hierarchies  and the task struc- 
ture  (partitioned  networks:  Hendrix  1979),  the  two 
structures were distinct. 
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Figure 1.  Discourse Segments, Focus Spaces and Dominance Hierarchy. 
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Several  researchers  (e.g.,  Linde  and  Goguen  1978, 
Reichman-Adar  1984)  misinterpreted  the  original 
research  in  an  unfortunate  and  unintended  way:  they 
took the focus-space hierarchy to include  (or be identical 
to) the task structure.  The conflation of these two struc- 
tures  forces  a  single  structure  to  contain  information 
about  attentional  state,  intentional  relationships,  and 
general  task,  knowledge.  It  prevents  a  theory  from 
accounting  adequately  for  certain  aspects  of  discourse, 
including interruptions  (see Section 5). 
A  second  instance  of  confusion  was  to  infer  (incor- 
rectly)  that the  task structure  was necessarily  a  prebuilt 
tree.  If the task structure is taken to be a  special case of 
intentional structure, it becomes clear that the tree struc- 
ture  is  simply  a  more  constrained  structure  than  one 
might require for other discourses;  the nature of the task 
related  to  the  task-oriented  discourse  is  such  that  the 
dominance  hier~irchy  of  the  intentional  structure  of  the 
dialogue has both dominance and satisfaction-precedence 
relationships, 5  while  other  discourses  may  not  exhibit 
significant  precedence  constraints  among  the  DSPs. 
Furthermore, there has never been any reason to assume 
that  the  task  structures  in  task-oriented  dialogues  are 
prebuilt,  any more than  the  intentional  structure  of any 
other kind of discourses. It is rather that one objective of 
discourse  theory  (not  a  topic considered  here,  however) 
is to explain how the OCP builds up a  model of the task 
structure by using information supplied in the discourse. 
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  conflating  the 
aforementioned  two roles of information  about the  task 
itself  (as  a  portion  of  general  commonsense  knowledge 
and as a special case of intentional structure)  was regret- 
table,  as  it  fails  to  make  an  important  distinction. 
Furthermore,  as  is  clear when  intentional  structures  are 
considered  more  generally,  such  a  conflation  of  roles 
does not allow for differences between what one knows 
about a task and one's intentions for (or what one makes 
explicit in discourse about) performing a task. 
In  summary,  the  focusing  structure  is  the  central 
repository for the contextual information needed to proc- 
ess  utterances  at  each point  in  the  discourse.  It distin- 
guishes  those  objects,  properties,  and  relations  that  are 
most  salient  at  that  point  and,  moreover,  has  links  to 
relevant parts of both the linguistic and intentional struc- 
tures.  During a discourse, an increasing amount of infor- 
mation,  only some of which  continues  to  be needed  for 
the interpretation  of subsequent  utterances,  is discussed. 
Hence, it becomes more and  more necessary to  be able 
to identify relevant discourse  segments, the  entities  they 
make  salient,  and  their  DSPs.  The  role  of  attentional 
state in delineating  the information necessary for under- 
standing is thus central to discourse processing. 
3  Two EXAMPLES 
To illustrate  the  basic theory we have just  sketched,  we 
will  give  a  brief  analysis  of  two  kinds  of  discourse:  an 
argument  from  a  rhetoric  text  and  ~i  task-oriented 
dialogue.  For each example we discuss  the segmentation 
of the discourse, the intentions that underlie this segmen- 
tation,  and the  relationships  among the  various DSPs.  In 
each  case,  we  point  out  some  of  the  linguistic  devices 
used  to indicate  segment boundaries  as well  as  some of 
the  expressions  whose  interpretations  depend  on  those 
boundaries.  The  analysis  is  concerned  with  specifying 
certain  aspects  of  the  behavior  to  be  explicated  by  a 
theory of discourse;  the remainder of the paper provides 
a partial account of this behavior. 
3.1  AN ARGUMENT 
Our  first example is  an  argument  taken  from a  rhetoric 
tdxt (Holmes and Gallagher 19176). It is an example used 
by Cohen  (1983)  in  her work on the  structure  of argu- 
ments.  Figure  2  shows  the  dialogue  and  the  eight 
discourse segments of which it is composed.  The division 
of  the  argument  into  separate  (numbered)  clauses  is 
Cohen's,  but  our  analysis  of  the  discourse  structure  is 
different,  since  in  Cohen's  analysis,  every  utterance  is 
directly  subordinated  to  another  utterance,  and  there  is 
only one structure  to encode linguistic  segmentation and 
the  purposes  of  utterances.  Although  both  analyses 
segment utterance  (4)  separately from utterances  (1-3), 
some readers place this utterance in DS1  with utterances 
(1)  through  (3);  this  is  an example of the  kind  of disa- 
greement  about  boundary  utterances  found  in  Mann's 
data  (as discussed  in  Section  2.1).  The  two placements 
lead to slightly different DSPs, but not to radically differ- 
ent intentional structures.  Because the differences do not 
affect the  major thrust  of the  argument,  we will discuss 
only one segmentation. 
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m 
DS0 
DS2 
$3 
5 
DS6 
I 
I.__. 
DS7 
1.  The  "movies"  are  so  attractive  to  the  great  American  public, 
2.  especially  to  young  people, 
3.  that  it  is  time  to  take  careful  thought  about  their  effect  on  mind 
and  morals. 
4.  Ought  any  parent  to  permit  his  children  to  attend  a  moving  picture 
show  often  or  without  being  quite  certain  of  the  show  he  permits 
them  to  see? 
5.  No  one  can  deny,  of  course,  that  great  educational  and  ethical 
gains  may  be  made  through  the  movies 
6.  because  of  their  astonishing  vividness. 
7.  But  the  important  fact  to  be  determined  is  the  total  result  of 
continuous  and  indiscriminate  attendance  on  shows  of  this  kind. 
8.  Can  it  be  other  than  harmful? 
9.  In  the  first  place  the  character  of  the  plays  is  seldom  of  the 
best. 
10.  One  has  only  to  read  the  ever-present  "movie"  billboard  to  see  how 
cheap,  melodramatic  and  vulgar  most  of  the  photoplays  are. 
11.  Even  the  best  plays,  moreover,  are  bound  to  be  exciting  and 
over-emotional. 
12.  Without  spoken  words,  facial  expression  and  gesture  must  carry  the 
meaning: 
13.  but  only  strong  emotion,  or  buffoonery  can  be  represented  through 
facial  expression  and  gesture. 
14.  The  more  reasonable  and  quiet  aspects  of  life  are  necessarily 
neglected. 
15.  How  can  our  young  people  drink  in  through  their  eyes  a  continuous 
spectacle  of  intense  and  strained  activity  and  feeling  without 
harmful  effects? 
16.  Parents  and  teachers  will  do  well  to  guard  the  young  against 
overindulgence  in  the  taste  for  the  "movie". 
Figure 2.  The Movies Essay. 
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Figure  3  lists  the  primary component of the  DSP  for 
each  of  these  segments  and  Figure  4  shows  the  domi- 
nance relationships that hold among these intentions.  In 
Section  7  we  discuss  additional  components  of  the 
discourse  segment  purpose;  because  these  additional 
components are more important for completeness of the 
theory than for determining the essential dominance and 
satisfaction-precedence  relationships  between  DSPs,  we 
omit such details here.  Rather than commit ourselves to 
a  formal language  in  which  to  express the  intentions  of 
the  discourse,  we  will  use  a  shorthand  notation  and 
English  sentences  that  are  intended  to  be  a  gloss  for  a 
formal statement of the actual intentions. 
IO:  (Intend 
I1:  (Intend 
I2:  (Intend 
13:  (Intend 
14:  (Intend 
15:  (Intend 
I6:  (Intend 
17:  (Intend 
ICP (Believe OCP PO)) 
where PO  =  the proposition that parents and teachers  should guard the young 
from overindulgence in the movies. 
ICP (Believe OCP P1)) 
where P1  =  the  proposition that  it is time to consider  the  effect of movies on 
mind and morals. 
ICP (Believe OCP P2)) 
where P2 =  the proposition that young people cannot drink in through their eyes 
a continuous spectacle of intense and strained activity without harmful effects. 
ICP (Believe OCP P3)) 
where  P3  --  the  proposition  that  it  is  undeniable  that  great  educational  and 
ethical gains may be made through the movies. 
ICP (Believe OCP P4)) 
where  P4  =  the  proposition  that  although  there  are  gains,  the  total  result  of 
continuous and indiscriminate attendance at movies is harmful. 
ICP (Believe OCP P5)) 
where P5  =  the proposition that the content of movies (i.e., the character of the 
plays) is not the best. 
ICP (Believe OCP P6)) 
where P6 =  the proposition  that the stories (i.e., the plays) in movies are excit- 
ing and over-emotional. 
ICP (Believe OCP P7)) 
where P7  =  the proposition that movies portray strong emotion and buffoonery 
while neglecting the quiet and reasonable aspects of life. 
Figure 3.  Primary intentions of the DSPs for Moviesessay. 
I0  DOM  I1 
I0  DOM  12 
12  DOM  13 
12  DOM  14 
14  DOM  15 
14  DOM  16 
16  DOM  17 
Figure 4.  Dominance relationships for the DSPs of the Movies essay. 
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All the primary intentions for this essay are intentions 
that the reader  (OCP) come to believe some proposition. 
Some of these  propositions,  such as  P5  and  P6,  can be 
read  off  the  surface  utterances  directly.  Other  prop- 
ositions and the intemions of which they are part, such as 
P2  and  12,  are  moCe  indirect.  Like  the  Gricean  utter- 
ance'-level  intentions  (the  analogy  with  these  will  be 
explored in Section 7), DSPs may or may not be directly 
expressed  in  the  discourse.  In  particular,  they  may  be 
expressed in any of the following ways: 
1.  explicitly  as in I  intend for you to believe that it's time 
to  consider  the effects  of movies  on  mind and  morals. 
[which would produce I1 ] 
2.  directly,  in  one  utterance,  as  in  (3)  [which  does 
produce I 1  ] 
3.  directly,  through  multiple  utterances,  as  in  using  (7) 
and  the  utterance  It  can  only  be harmful to produce 
14, 
4.  by derivation,  in one or more utterances  with an associ- 
ated context,  as in (15) to produce 12. 
Not only may information about the DSP be conveyed 
by a  number of features of the utterances in a  discourse, 
but it also may come in any utterance in a  segment.  For 
example, although I0 is the DP, it is stated directly only in 
the last utterance of the essay.  This leads to a number of 
questions  about  the  ways in  which  OCPs  can  recognize 
discourse  purposes,  and  about  those  junctures  at  which 
they need to do so.  We turn to these matters directly in 
Subsection 4.1. 
This  discourse  also  provides  several  examples  of the 
different kinds of interactions that can hold between the 
linguistic  expressions  in  a  discourse  and  the  discourse 
structure. It includes examples of the devices that may be 
used  to  mark  overtly the  boundaries  between  discourse 
segments  -  examples  of  the  use  of  aspect,  mood,  and 
particular cue phrases -  as well as of the use of referring 
expressions that are affected by discourse segment boun- 
daries. 
The use of cue phrases to indicate  discourse bounda- 
ries  is  illustrated  in  utterances  (9)  and  (11);  in  (9)  the 
phrase in the first place marks the beginning of DS5 while 
in  (11)  moreover ends  DS5  and  marks  the  start  of DS6. 
These  phrases  also  carry  information  about  the  inten- 
tional  structure,  namely,  that  DSP5  and DSP6  are  domi- 
nated by DSP4.  In some cases, cue phrases have multiple 
functions;  they  convey propositional  content  as  well  as 
marking discourse segment boundaries.. The but in utter- 
ance (7) is an example of such a multiple function use. 
The boundaries between DS1  and DS2,  DS4 and DS5, 
and  DS4  and  DS2  reflect  changes  of  aspect  and  mood. 
The switch from declarative,  present  tense  to interroga- 
tive  modal  aspect  does  not  in  itself  seem  to  signal  the 
boundary  (for  recognition  purposes)  in  this  discourse 
unambiguously,  but  it  does  indicate  a  possible  line  of 
demarcation which, in fact, is valid. 
The effect of segmentation on referring expressions is 
shown by the  use  of the  generic noun phrase  a  moving 
picture show in  (4).  Although a  reference to the movies 
was  made  with  a  pronoun  (their)  in  (3),  a  full  noun 
phrase  is used  in  (4).  This  use  reflects,  and perhaps in 
part marks, the boundary between the segments DS1 and 
DS2. 
Finally, this discourse has an example of the trade-off 
between explicitly marking a  discourse boundary, as well 
as  the  relationship  between  the  associated  DSPs,  and 
reasoning  about  the  intentions  themselves.  There  is  no 
overt linguistic marker of the beginning of DS7; its sepa- 
ration must be inferred from DSP7  and its relationship to 
DSP6. 
3.2  A TASK-ORIENTED DIALOGUE 
The  second  example  is  a  fragment  of  a  task-oriented 
dialogue  taken  from  Grosz  (1981;  it  is  from  the  same 
corpus that was used by Grosz  1974).  Figure 5  contains 
the dialogue fragment and indicates the boundaries for its 
main segments.  7 Figure 6 gives the primary component of 
the  DSPs  for  this  fragment  and  shows  the  dominance 
relationships between them. 
In contrast with the movies essay, the primary compo- 
nents of the DSPs in this dialogue are mostly intentions of 
the segment's ICP that the OCP intend to perform some 
action.  Also,  unlike  the  essay,  the  dialogue  has  two 
agents initiating the different discourse segments.  In this 
particular segment, the expert is the ICP of DS1 and DS5, 
while  the  apprentice  is  the  ICP of DS2-4.  To furnish  a 
complete  account  of  the  intentional  structure  of  this 
discourse, one must be able to say how the satisfaction of 
one  agent's  intentions  can  contribute  to  satisfying  the 
intentions of another agent.  Such an account is  beyond 
the scope of this paper, but in Section 7 we discffss some 
of the complexities involved in providing one  (as well as 
its role in discourse theory). 
For  the  purposes  of discussing  this  example,  though, 
we need to postulate  two properties  of the  relationships 
among  the  participants'  intentions.  These  properties 
seem  to  be  rooted  in  features  of  cooperative  behavior 
and depend on the two participants' sharing some partic- 
ular  knowledge  of the  task.  First,  it  is  a  shared  belief 
that,  unless  he  states  otherwise,  the  OCP will  adopt the 
intention to perform an action that the ICP intended him 
to.  Second,  in  adopting  the  intention  to  carry out  that 
action,  the  OCP  also  intends  to  perform  whatever 
subactions  are  necessary.  Thus,  once  the  apprentice, 
intends to remove the flywheel, he  also commits himself 
to the collateral intentions of loosening the setscrews and 
pulling  the  wheel  off.  Note,  however,  that  not  all  the 
subactions  need  to  be  introduced  explicitly  into  the 
discourse. The apprentice may do several actions that are 
never mentioned,  and the  expert  may assume  that these 
are  being undertaken  on the  basis  of other information 
that  the  apprentice  obtains.  The  partiality  of the  inten- 
tional structure  stems to some extent from these charac- 
teristics of intentions and actions. 
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DS1  (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
DS2  (5) 
(S) 
(7) 
(B) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
DS3  (12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
DS4  (18) 
(19) 
(z0) 
(zl) 
(zz) 
(z3) 
(24) 
(z5) 
E:  First  you  have  to  remove  the  flywheel. 
A:  How  do  I  remove  the  flywheel? 
E:  First,  loosen  the  two  allen  head  setscrews 
holding  it  to  the  shaft,  then  pull  it  off. 
A:  OK. 
I  can  only  find  one  screw.  Where's  the  other  one? 
E:  On  the  hub  of  the  flywheel. 
A:  That's  the  one  I  found.  Where's  the  other  one? 
E:  About  ninety  degrees  around  the  hub  from  the  first  one. 
A:  I  don't  understand.  I  can  only  find  one.  Oh 
wait,  yes  I  think  I  was  on  the  wrong  wheel. 
E:  Show  me  what  you  are  doing. 
A:  I  was  on  the  wrong  wheel  and  l  can  find 
them  both  now. 
The  tool  I  have  is  awkward.  Is  there  another 
tool  that  I  could  use  instead? 
E:  Show  me  the  tool  you  are  using. 
A:  OK. 
E:  Are  you  sure  you  are  using  the  right  size 
key? 
A:  I'll  try  some  others. 
I  found  an  angle  I  can  get  at  it. 
The  two  screws  are  loose,  but  I'm  having  trouble 
getting  the  wheel  off. 
E:  Use  the  wheelpuller"  Do  you  know  how  to  use 
it? 
A:  No. 
E:  Do  you  know  what  it  looks  like? 
A:  Yes. 
E:  Show  it  to  me  please. 
A:  OK. 
E:  Good,  Loosen  the  screw  in  the  center  and 
place  the  jaws  around  the  hub  of  the 
wheel,  then  tighten  the  screw  onto  the 
center  of  the  shaft.  The  wheel  should 
slide  off. 
Figure 5. A segment of a task-oriented dialogue. 
As  in  the  movies  essay,  some  of  the  DSPs  for  this 
dialogue  are  expressed  directly  in  utterances.  For 
instance,  utterances  (1),  (5),  and  (12)  directly  express 
the  primary  components  of  DSP1,  DSP2  and  DSP3, 
respectively.  The  primary  component  of  DSP4  is  a 
derived  intention.  The  surface  intention  of  but  I'm 
having  trouble getting the wheel off is that the apprentice 
intends the expert to believe that the apprentice is having 
trouble  taking  off the  flywheel.  14  is  derived  from the 
utterance  and  its  surface  intention,  as  well  as  from 
features of discourse, conventions about what intentions 
are associated with the 1 am having  trouble  doing X  type 
186 
of utterance, and what the 1CP and OCP know about the 
task they have undertaken. 
The dominance relationship that holds between I1 and 
12, as well as the one that holds between I1  and 13, may 
seem  problematic  at  first  glance.  It  is  not  clear  how 
locating any single  setscrew contributes  to removing the 
flywheel.  It is even less clear how, in and of itself, identi- 
fying another tool does. Two facts provide the link: first, 
that  the  apprentice  (the  OCP of DS1)  has  taken  on the 
task of removing the  flywheel; second, that  the  appren- 
tice  and  expert  share  certain  knowledge  about the  task. 
Some  of  this  shared  task  knowledge  comes  from  the 
discourse  per  se  [e.g.,  utterance  (3)],  but  some  of  it 
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comes  from general  knowledge,  perceptual  information, 
and the like.  Thus, a  combination of information is rele- 
vant to  determining 12  and 13  and  their  relationships  to 
I1, including all of the following:  the fact that I1 is part 
of the intentional structure, the fact that the apprentice is 
currently  working  on  satisfying  I1,  the  utterance-level 
intentions of utterances  (5) and (12), and general know- 
ledge about the task. 
The  satisfaction-precedence  relations  among  12,  13, 
and  14  are  not  communicated  directly  in  the  dialogue, 
but,  like dominance relations,  depend  on domain know- 
ledge.  One piece of relevant knowledge is that a satisfac- 
tion  precedence  relation  exists  between  loosening  the 
setscrews  and  pulling  off the  flywheel.  That  relation  is 
shared knowledge  that is  stated directly  (First  loosen  .... 
then  pull).  The relation, along with the fact that both 12 
and 13  contribute to loosening the setscrews, and that 14 
contributes  to pulling off the flywheel, makes it possible 
to conclude 13  SP 14  and 12  SP 14.  To conclude that 12 
SP 13,  the apprentice must employ knowledge of how to 
go about loosening screw-like objects. 
The  dominance  and  satisfaction-precedence  relations 
for this  task-oriented fragment form a  tree of intentions 
rather than just a  partial ordering.  In general,  however, 
for any fragment,  task-oriented  or otherwise,  this is not 
necessary. 
It is essential to notice that the intentional structure is 
neither  identical  to nor isomorphic to a  general plan for 
removing the flywheel.  It is not identical because a  plan 
encompasses  more  than  a  collection  of  intentions  and 
relationships  between  them  (compare  Pollack's  (1986) 
critique of AI planning formalisms as the basis for infer- 
ring intentions in discourse).  It is not isomorphic because 
the intentional structure has a different substructure from 
the general plan for removing the flywheel.  In addition 
to the intentions arising from steps in the plan, the inten- 
tional structure  typically contains DSPs corresponding to 
intentions  generated  by  the  particular  execution  of  the 
task and the dialogue.  For example, the general plan for 
the disassembly of a flywheel includes subplans for loos- 
ening  the  setscrews  and pulling  off  the  wheel;  it  might 
also include  subplans  (of the  loosening step)  for finding 
the  setscrews,  finding  a  tool  with  which  to  loosen  the 
screws, and loosening each screw individually.  However, 
this  plan  would  not  contain  contingency  subplans  for 
what to do when one cannot find the  screws or realizes 
that the available tool is unsatisfactory.  Intentions I2 and 
I3  stem  from  difficulties  encountered  in  locating  and 
loosening the  setscrews.  Thus,  the  intentional  structure 
for this fragment is not isomorphic to the general plan for 
removing the flywheel. 
Utterance  (18)  offers another  example  of  the  differ- 
ence between the intentional structure and a general plan 
for the task.  This utterance is part of DS4 -  not just part 
of DS1 -  even though it contains references to more than 
one  single  part  of  the  overall task  (which  is  what  I1  is 
about).  It functions  to establish a  new DSP,  14,  as most 
salient.  Rather  than  being regarded  as  a  report  on  the 
overall status of the  task, the  first clause is best seen as 
modifying  the  DSP. 8  With  it,  the  apprentice  tells  the 
expert that the trouble in removing the wheel is not with 
the  screws.  Thus,  although  general  task  knowledge  is 
used  in  determining  the  intentional  structure,  it  is  not 
identical to it. 
In this dialogue, there are fewer instances in which cue 
phrases  are  employed  to  indicate  segment  boundaries 
than occur in the movies essay.  The primary example is 
the  use  of first  in  (1)  to  mark the  start of the  segment 
and  to  indicate  that  its  DSP  is  the  first  of  several 
intentions  whose satisfaction will contribute to satisfying 
the larger discourse of which they are a part. 
Primary Intentions: 
II"  (Intend Exper t (Intend Apprentic  e (Remove A  flywheel))) 
I2:  (Intend A  (Intend E  (Tell E  A  (Location other setscrew)))) 
I3:  (Intend A  (Intend E  (Identify E  A  another tool))) 
I4:  (Intend A  (Intend E  (Tell E  A  (How (Getoff A  wheel))))) 
I5:  (Intend E  (Know-How-to A  (Use A wheelpuller))) 
Dominance Relationships: 
I1  DOM  I2 
I1  DOM  I3 
I1  DOM  I4 
I4  DOM  I5 
Satisfaction-Precedence Relationships: 
I2  SP  I3 
I2  SP  I4 
I3  SP  I4 
Figure 6. Intentional structure for the task-oriented dialogue segment. 
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The dialogue includes a clear example of the influence 
of  discourse  structure  on  referring  expressions.  The 
phrase  the  screw  in  the  center is  used in  (25)  to refer to 
the  center  screw of the  wheelpuller,  not one of the  two 
setscrews  mentioned  in  (18).  This  use  of  the  phrase  is 
possible because of the attentional state of the discourse 
structure at the time the phrase is uttered. 
4  PROCESSING ISSUES 
In previous sections of the paper, we abstracted from the 
cognitive states of the discourse participants. The various 
components  of  discourse  structure  discussed  so  far  are 
properties  of  the  discourse  itself,  not  of  the  discourse 
participants.  To use the  theory in constructing computa- 
tional models requires determining how each of the indi- 
vidual  components  projects  onto  the  model  of  an 
individual discourse participant.  In this regard, the prin- 
cipal issues include specifying 
1.  how  the  ICP  indicates  and  the  OCP  recognizes  the 
beginning and end of a discourse segment, 
2.  how  the  OCP  recognizes  the  discourse  segment 
purposes, and 
3.  how the focus space stack operates. 
In  essence,  the  OCP  must  judge  for  each  utterance 
whether  it  starts  a  new  segment,  ends  the  current  one 
(and  possibly  some  of  its  embedding  segments),  or 
contributes to the current one.  The information available 
to the OCP for recognizing that an utterance starts a new 
segment includes any explicit linguistic cues contained in 
the utterance  (see  Section 6 9  )  as well as the relationship 
between its utterance-level intentions and the active DSPs 
(i.e.,  those in some focus space that is still  on the stack). 
Likewise, the fact that an utterance ends a  segment may 
be indicated explicitly by linguistic cues or implicitly from 
its  utterance-level  intentions  and  their  relationship  to 
elements of the intentional structure. If neither of these is 
the  case,  the  utterance  is  part  of  the  current  segment. 
Thus, intention recognition and focus space management 
play  key  roles  in  processing.  Moreover,  they  are  also 
related:  the  intentional  structure  is  a  primary  factor  in 
determining  focus  space  changes,  and  the  focus  space 
structure  helps  constrain the  intention  recognition proc- 
ess. 
4.1  INTENTION RECOGNITION 
The  recognition  of DP/DSPs  is  the  central  issue  in  the 
computational  modeling  of  intentional  structure.  If,  as 
we  have  claimed,  for the  discourse  to  be  coherent  and 
comprehensible, the OCP must be able to recognize both 
the  DP/DSPs 10  and  relationships  (dominance  and  satis- 
faction-precedence) between them,  then the  question of 
how the OCP does so is a crucial issue. 
For the discourse as a whole, as well as for each of its 
segments, the OCP must identify both the intention that 
serves as the discourse segment purpose and its relation- 
ship to other discourse-level intentions.  In particular, the 
OCP  must  be  able  to  recognize  which  other  DSPs  that 
specific  intention  dominates  and  is  dominated  by,  and, 
where  relevant,  with  which  other  DSPs  it  has  satisfac- 
tion-precedence  relationships.  Two  issues  that  are 
central to the  recognition problem are  what information 
the  OCP  can  utilize  in  effecting the  recognition  and  at 
what  point  in  the  discourse  that  information  becomes 
available. 
An adequate  computational model of the  recognition 
process  depends  critically  on  an  adequate  theory  of 
intention  and  action;  this,  of course,  is  a  large  research 
problem  in  itself  and  one  not  restricted  to  matters  of 
discourse.  The  need  to  use  such  a  model for  discourse, 
however, adds certain constraints on the adequacy of any 
theory or model.  Pollack (1986)  describes  several prop- 
erties  such theories  and models must possess if they are 
to be adequate for supporting recognition of intention in 
single-utterance queries;  she shows how current AI plan- 
ning models are  inadequate  and  proposes  an  alternative 
planning  formalism.  The  need  to  enable  recognition  of 
discourse-level  intentions  leads  to  yet  another  set  of 
requirements. 
As will become clear in what follows, the information 
available  to  the  OCP  comes  from  a  variety  of  sources. 
Each  of  these  can  typically provide  partial  information 
about the DSPs and their relationships.  These sources are 
each partially constraining, but only in their ensemble do 
they constrain in full.  To the  extent  that more informa- 
tion is furnished by any one source, commensurately less 
is needed from the others.  The overall processing model 
must be one of constraint satisfaction that can operate on 
partial  information.  It  must  allow  for  incrementally 
constraining the range of possibilities on the basis of new 
information  that  becomes  available  as  the  segment 
progresses. 
4.1.1  INFORMATION CONSTRAINING THE DSP 
At least three different kinds of information play a role in 
the determination of the DSP: specific linguistic markers, 
utterance-level  intentions,  and  general  knowledge about 
actions  and  objects  in  the  domain  of  discourse.  Each 
plays a  part in the OCP's recognition of the DSP and can 
be utilized by the ICP to facilitate this recognition. 
Cue  phrases  are  the  most  distinguished  linguistic 
means  that  speakers  have  for  indicating  discourse 
segment boundaries and conveying information about the 
DSP.  Recent evidence by Hirschberg and Pierrehumbert 
(i~986)  suggests  that  certain  intonational  properties  of 
utterances also provide partial information about the DSP 
relationships.  Because some cue phrases may be used as 
clausal  connectors,  there  is  a  need  to  distinguish  their 
discourse  use  from  their  use  in  conveying propositional 
content at the utterance level.  For example, the word but 
functions as  a  boundary marker  in  utterance  (7)  of the 
discourse in Section 3.1, but it can also be used solely (as 
in the current utterance)  to convey propositional content 
(e.g.,  the  conjunction of two propositions)  and  serve to 
connect two clauses within a segment. 
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As  discussed  in  Section  6,  cue  phrases  can  provide 
information  about  dominance  and  satisfaction-prece- 
dence  relationships  between  segments'  DSPs.  However, 
they may not completely specify which DSP dominates or 
satisfaction-precedes the  DSP of the  segment they start. 
Furthermore, cue phrases that explicitly convey informa- 
tion only about the  attentional  structure  (see  Section 6) 
may be  ambiguous about the  state  to which attention  is 
to shift.  For example,  if there  have  been  several  inter- 
ruptions (see Section 5),  the phrase but anyway indicates 
a  return  to  some  previously  interrupted  discourse,  but 
does not specify which one. Although cue phrases do not 
completely specify a DSP, the information they provide is 
useful in limiting the options to be considered. 
The second kind of information the OCP has available 
is  the  utterance-level intention  of each utterance in the 
discourse.  As  the  discussion  of  the  movies  example 
(Section  3.1)  pointed  out,  the  DSP  may be  identical  to 
the  utterance-level  intention  of  some  utterance  in  the 
segment.  Alternatively,  the  DSP  may  combine  the 
intentions  of  several  utterances,  as  is  illustrated  in  the 
following discourse segment: 
I want you to arrange a trip for me to Palo Alto. 
It will be for two weeks. 
I only fly on TWA. 
The  DSP  for  this  segment  is,  roughly,  that  the  ICP 
intends  for  the  OCP  to  make  (complete)  trip  arrange- 
ments  for  the  ICP  to  go  to  Palo  Alto  for  two  weeks, 
under  the  constraint  that  any  flights  be  on  TWA.  The 
Gricean  intentions  for  these  three  utterances  are  as 
follows: 
Utterance I : ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP 
intends that OCP intend to make trip plans 
for ICP to go to Palo Alto 
Utterance2:  ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP 
intends OCP to believe that the trip will last 
two weeks 
Utterance3:  ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP 
intends OCP to believe that ICP flies only on 
TWA 
These  intentions  must  be  combined in  some  way to 
produce the DSP.  The process is quite complex, since the 
OCP must recognize that the reason for utterances 2 and 
3  is not simply to have some new beliefs about the ICP, 
but to use those beliefs in arranging the trip.  While this 
example  fits  the  schema  of  a  request  followed  by  two 
informings,  schemata  will  not  suffice  to  represent  the 
behavior as a general rule. A  different sequence of utter- 
ances  with  different  utterance-level  intentions  can have 
the same DSP; this is the case in the following segment: 
S 1:  Have I told you yet to arrange my trip to Palo Alto? 
Remember that I will fly only on TWA. OK? 
$2:  OK. 
$3:  I'm planning on staying for two weeks. 
It is possible for a  sequence that consists of a  request 
followed by two informings not to result  in  a  modifica- 
tion  of  the  trip  plans.  For  example,  in  the  following 
sequence the third utterance results in changing the way 
the arrangements are made,  rather than constraining the 
nature of the arrangements themselves. 
I want you to arrange a two-week trip for me to Palo 
Alto.  I fly only on TWA.  The rates go up tomorrow, 
so you'll want to call today. 
Not  only  is  the  contribution  of  utterance-level 
intentions to DSPs complicated, but in some instances the 
DSP  for a  segment  may both  constrain  and  be  partially 
determined by the  Gricean intention  for some utterance 
in  the  segment.  For  example,  the  Gricean-intention  for 
utterance  (15)  in  the  movies  example  (Section  3.1)  is 
derived from a  combination of facts about the utterance 
itself, and from its place in the discourse.  On the surface, 
(15)  appears to be  a  question addressed  to the OCP; its 
intention would be roughly that the ICP intends the OCP 
to believe that the ICP wants to know how young people, 
etc.  But  (15)  is  actually a  rhetorical question and has a 
very different intention associated with it -  namely, that 
the  ICP  intends  the  OCP  to  believe  proposition  P2 
(namely, that young people cannot drink in through their 
eyes a continuous spectacle of intense and strained activ- 
ity without harniful effects). In this example, this partic- 
ular intention is also the primary component of the DSP. 
The  third  kind  of  information  that  plays  a  role  in 
determining  the  DP/DSPs  is  shared  knowledge  about 
actions  and  objects  in  the  domain  of  discourse.  This 
shared  knowledge  is  especially  important  when  the 
linguistic  markers  and  utterance-level  intentions  are 
insufficient for determining the DSP precisely. 
In  Section  7  we  introduce  two  relations,  a  supports 
relation  between  propositions  and  a  generates  relation 
between  actions,  and  present  two  rules  stating  equiv- 
alences;  one  links  a  dominance  relation  between  two 
DSPs with  a  supports  relation between  propositions  and 
the  other links  a  dominance relation  between  DSPs  to a 
generates relation between actions.  Use of these rules in 
one  direction  allows  for  (partially)  determining  what 
supports or generates  relationship  holds  from the  domi- 
nance relationship. But the rules can be used in the oppo- 
site direction also: if, from the content of utterances and 
reasoning  about  the  domain of discourse,  a  supports  or 
generates relationship can be determined, then the domi- 
nates  relationship  between DSPs can be  determined.  In 
such  cases  it  is  important  to  derive  the  dominance 
relationship so that the appropriate intentional and atten- 
tional structures are available for processing or determin- 
ing the interpretation of the subsequent discourse. 
From  the  perspective  of  recognition,  a  trade-off 
implicit in the two equivalences is  important.  If the ICP 
makes  the  dominance  relationship  between  two  DSPs 
explicit  (e.g.,  with  cue  phrases),  then  the  OCP  can  use 
this  information  to  help  recognize  the  (ICP's  beliefs 
about the)  supports relationship.  Conversely, if the ICP's 
utterances  make  clear  the  (ICP's  beliefs  about  the) 
supports or generates relationship,  then the OCP can use 
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this  information  to  help  recognize  the  dominance 
relationship.  Although it is most helpful to use the domi- 
nance relationships  to constrain the  search for appropri- 
ate supports and generates relationships, sometimes these 
latter  relationships  can  be  inferred  reasonably  directly 
from  the  utterances  in  a. segment  using  general  know- 
ledge  about  the  objects  and  actions  in  the  domain  of 
discourse.  It remains  an open question  what inferences 
are  needed  and  how  complex  it  will  be  to  compute 
supports  and  generates  relationships  if  the  dominance 
relationship is not directly indicated in a discourse. 
Utterances from the movies essay illustrate this trade- 
off.  In  utterance  (9),  the  phrase  in  the  first  place 
expresses  the  dominance  relationship  between  DSPs  of 
the new segment DS5  and the parent segment DS4 direct- 
ly.  Because of the dominance relationship (as well as the 
intentions  expressed  in  the  utterances),  the  OCP  can 
determine that the ICP believes that the proposition that 
the content of the plays is not the best provides support 
for the proposition that the result of indiscriminate movie 
going  is  harmful.  Hence  determining  dominance  yields 
the support relation.  The support relation can also yield 
dominance.  Utterances  (12)-(14),  which comprise DS7, 
are not explicitly marked for a dominance relation.  It can 
be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  propositions  in 
(12)-(14)  provide support for the proposition embedded 
in  DSP6  (that  is,  that  the  stories  in  movies are  exciting 
and over-emotional) that DSP6 dominates DSP7. 
Finally, the more information an ICP supplies explicit- 
ly in the actual utterances of a discourse, the less reason- 
ing  about  domain  information  an  OCP  has  to  do  to 
achieve  recognition.  Cohen  (1983)  has  made  a  similar 
claim regarding the problem of recognizing  the  relation- 
ship between one proposition and another. 
4.1.2  WHEN  IS THE  INTENTION  RECOGNIZED? 
As  discussed  in  Section  2.2,  the  intentional  structure 
evolves  as  the  discourse  does.  By  the  same  token,  the 
discourse  participants'  mental-state  correlates  of  the 
intentional structure are not prebuilt;  neither participant 
may have a  complete model  of the  intentional  structure 
"in  mind"  until  the  discourse  is  completed.  The  domi- 
nance  relationships  that  actually  shape  the  intentional 
structure  cannot be known a  priori, because the  specific 
intentions  that will come into play are not known (never 
by the OCP, hardly ever by the ICP) until the utterances 
in the discourse have been made.  Although it is assumed 
that  the  participants'  common  knowledge  includes 11 
enough information about the domain to determine vari- 
ous relationships such as supports and generates, it is not 
assumed  that,  prior  to  a  discourse,  they  actually  had 
inferred  and  are  aware  of all  the  relationships  they will 
need for that discourse. 
Because  any  of  the  utterances  in  a  segment  may 
contribute  information  relevant  to  a  complete  determi- 
nation  of  the  DSP,  the  recognition  process  is  not 
complete until the end of the segment. However, the OCP 
must be able to recognize at least a generalization of the 
DSP so that he can make the proper moves with respect 
to the attentional structure.  That is, some combination of 
explicit  indicators  and  intentional  and  propositional 
content  must allow the  OCP  to ascertain where  the DSP 
will fit in the  intentional  structure  at the  beginning  of a 
segment,  even  if  the  specific  intention  that  is  the  DSP 
cannot be determined until the end of the segment. 
Utterance  (15)  in  the  movies example  illustrates  this 
point.  The  author  writes,  "How  can our  young people 
drink  in  through  their  eyes  a  continuous  spectacle  of 
intense  and strained activity and feeling without harmful 
effects?"  The  primary intention  12  is  derived  from this 
utterance,  but  this  cannot  be done  until  very late in the 
discourse segment [since  (15)  occurs at the end of DS2]. 
Furthermore,  the  segment  for  which  12  is  primary  has 
complex embedding of other segments.  Utterance  (16), 
intention  I0, and DS0 constitute  another example of the 
expression  of  a  primary  intention  late  in  a  discourse 
segment.  In that case, I0 cannot be computed until (16) 
has been read,  and  (16)  is not only the last utterance  in 
DS0,  but is one that covers the  entire  essay.  If an OCP 
must recognize  a  DSP to understand  a  segment, then we 
ask:  how does the OCP recognize a  DSP when the utter- 
ance from which its primary intention is derived comes so 
late in the segment? 
We conjecture with regard to such segments as D2 of 
the movies essay that the primary intention  (e.g., 12) may 
be determined partially (and hence a  generalized version 
become  recognizable)  before  the  point  at  which  it  is 
actually expressed in the  discourse.  While  the DP/DSP 
may not be expressed early, there is still partial informa- 
tion  about it.  This  partial  information  often  suffices to 
establish  dominance  (or  satisfaction-precedence) 
relationships for additional segments.  As these latter are 
placed  in  the  hierarchy,  their  DSPs  can  provide  further 
partial  information  for  the  underspecified  DSP.  For 
example,  even  though  the  intention  I0  is  expressed 
directly  only  in  the  last  utterance  of  the  movies  essay, 
utterance  (4)  expresses an intention  to know whether  p 
or ~p is true (i.e., whether or not parents should let chil- 
dren see movies often and without close monitoring).  I0 
is  an intention  to believe, whose  proposition is a  gener- 
alization of the  ~p expressed in  (4).  Consider  also  the 
primary intention  14.  It occurs  in  a  segment  embedded 
within  DS2,  is  more  general  than  12,  but  is  an  approxi- 
mation to it.  It would not be surprising  to discover that 
OCPs  can  in  fact  predict  something  close  to  12  on  the 
basis  of  14,  utterances  (9)-(14),  and  the  partial  domi- 
nance hierarchy available at each point in the discourse. 
4.2  USE  OF  THE  ATYENTIONAL  STATE  MODEL 
The  focus  space  structure  enables  certain  processing 
decisions  to  be  made  locally.  In  particular,  it  limits  the 
information  that  must  be  considered  in  recognizing  the 
DSP as well as that considered in identifying the referents 
of certain classes of definite noun phrases. 
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A  primary role of the focus space stack is to constrain 
the  range  of  DSPs  considered  as  candidates  for  domi- 
nation  or  satisfaction-precedence  of  the  DSP  of  the 
current segment.  Only those DSPs  in some space on the 
focusing stack  are  viable  prospects.  As  a  result  of this 
use of the focusing structure, the theory predicts that this 
decision  will  be  a  local  one  with  respect  to  attentional 
state.  Because  two  focus  spaces  may be  close  to  each 
other  in  the  attentional  structure  without  the  discourse 
segments  they arise  from necessarily  being close to one 
another and  vice versa,  this  prediction corresponds to  a 
claim  that  locality  in  the  focusing  structure  is  what 
matters to determination of the intentional structure. 
A  second role of the focusing structure is to constrain 
the  OCP's search for possible  referents  of definite  noun 
phrases  and  pronouns.  To  illustrate  this  role,  we  will 
consider  the  phrase  the  screw  in  the  center  in  utterance 
(25)  of  the  task-oriented  dialogue  of  Section  3.  The 
focus stack configuration when utterance  (25)  is  spoken 
is shown in Figure 7.  The stack contains (in bottom-to- 
top order)  focus spaces FSI, FS4,  and  FS5  for segments 
DS1, DS4,  and DS5,  respectively.  For DS5  the wheelpul- 
ler  is  a  focused entity,  while  for DS4  the  two setscrews 
are  (because  they are explicitly mentioned).  The entities 
in  FS5  are  considered  before  those  in  FS4  as  potential 
referents.  The  wheelpuller  has  three  screws:  two  small 
screws  fasten  the  side  arms,  and  a  large  screw  in  the 
center is the main functioning part. As a result, this large 
screw is implicitly in focus in FS5  (Grosz  1977) and thus 
identified  as the referent without the two setscrews ever 
being considered. 
Attentional state  also  constrains  the  search for refer- 
ents of pronouns. Because pronouns contain less explicit 
information  about  their  referents  than  definite 
descriptions,  additional  mechanisms  are  needed  to 
account for what may and may not be pronominalized in 
the  discourse.  One such mechanism is  centering (which 
we  previously  called  immediate  focusing;  Grosz,  Joshi, 
and Weinstein 1983; Sidner 1979). 
Centering, like focusing, is  a  dynamic behavior, but is 
a  more local phenomenon.  In brief,  a  backward-looking 
center  is  associated  with  each  utterance  in  a  discourse 
segment; of all the focused elements the backward-look- 
ing center is the one that is central in that utterance (i.e., 
the  uttering  of the  particular  sequence  of words  at  that 
point  in  the  discourse).  A  combination  of  syntactic, 
semantic,  and  discourse  information  is  used  to  identify 
the backward-looking center. The fact that some entity is 
the  backward-looking  center  is  used  to  constrain  the 
search  for  the  referent  of  a  pronoun  in  a  subsequent 
utterance.  Note  that  unlike  the  DSP,  which  is  constant 
for  a  segment,  the  backward-looking center  may  shift: 
different  entities  may  become  more  salient  at  different 
points in the segment. 
The presence of both centers  and DSPs in this  theory 
leads  us  to  an  intriguing  conjecture:  that  "topic"  is  a 
concept that  is  used  ambiguously for both the  DSP of a 
segment and the center.  In the literature  the concept of 
"topic" has appeared in many guises.  In syntactic form it 
is used to describe the preposing of syntactic constituents 
in English and the "wa" marking in Japanese.  Research- 
ers have used it to describe the sentence topic (i.e.,  what 
the  sentence is  about; Firbas  1971,  Sgall,  Haji~ov~,  and 
SETSCREWS 3 
FLYWHEELIo 
DSP 1 
FS1 
SCREW 1 
SCREW 2 
DSP 2 
FS2 
SETSCREWS 3 
FLYWHEELIo 
DSP 1 
FS1 
ALLEN WRENCH 9 
KEYS14 
DSP 3 
FS3 
SETSCREWS 3 
FLYWHEELlo 
DSP 1 
FS1 
WHEEL PULLER 8 
DSP 5 
FS5 
SETSCREWS 3 
FLYWHEELIo 
DSP  4 
FS4 
SETSCREWS 3 
FLYWHEELlo 
DSP 1 
FS1 
time 
Figure 7.  Focus Stack Transitions Leading up to Utterance (25). 
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Benesova  1973),  and  as  a  pragmatic  notion  (Reinhart 
1981);  others  want  to  use  the  term for discourse  topic, 
either  to  mean  what  the  discourse  is  about,  or  to  be 
defined  as  those  proposition(s)  the  ICP  provides  or 
requests new information about (see Reinhart (1981)  for 
a review of many of the notions of aboutness and topic). 
It appears that many of the descriptions of sentence topic 
correspond  (though  not  always)  to  centers,  while 
discourse topic corresponds to the DSP of a segment or of 
the discourse. 
5  APPLICATION OF THE THEORY: INTERRUPTIONS 
Interruptions in discourses pose an important test of any 
theory  of  discourse  structure.  Because  processing  an 
utterance  requires  ascertaining  how it fits  with  previous 
discourse, it is crucial to decide which parts of the previ- 
ous  discourse  are  relevant  to  it,  and  which  cannot  be. 
Interruptions, by definition, do not fit; consequently their 
treatment  has  implications  for  the  treatment  of  the 
normal flow of discourse.  Interruptions  may take many 
forms -  some are  not  at  all relevant  to  the  content  and 
flow of  the  interrupted  discourse,  others  are  quite  rele- 
vant,  and  many  fall  somewhere  in  between  these 
extremes.  A  theory  must  differentiate  these  cases  and 
explain  (among  other  things)  what  connections  exist 
between  the  main  discourse  and  the  interruption,  and 
how the relationship between them affects the processing 
of the utterances in both. 
The importance  of distinguishing  between  intentional 
structure  and  attentional  state  is  evident  in  the  three 
examples  considered  in  Subsections  5.2,  5.3,  and  5.4. 
The  distinction  also  permits  us  to  explain  a  type  of 
behavior  deemed  by  others  to  be  similar  -  so-called 
semantic  returns  -  an  issue  we  examine  in  Subsection 
5.5. 
These  examples  do  not  exhaust  the  types  of  inter- 
ruptions  that  can  occur  in  discourse.  There  are  other 
ways  to  vary  the  explicit  linguistic  (and  nonlinguistic) 
indicators  used  to  indicate  boundaries,  the  relationships 
between  DSPs,  and  the  combinations  of  focus  space 
relationships  present.  However,  the  examples  provide 
illustrations  of interruptions  at different points along the 
spectrum  of  relevancy  to  the  main  discourse.  Because 
they can be explained more adequately by the  theory of 
discourse structure presented here than by previous theo- 
ries,  they  support  the  importance  of the  distinctions  we 
have drawn. 
5.1  PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
From an intuitive view, we observe that interruptions  are 
pieces of discourse  that break the flow of the preceding 
discourse.  An interruption  is in  some way distinct  from 
the  rest  of  the  preceding  discourse;  after  the  break for 
the interruption,  the discourse  returns  to the  interrupted 
piece of discourse.  In the  example below, from Polanyi 
and  Scha  (forthcoming),  there  are  two  (separate) 
discourses, D1 indicated in normal type, and D2 in italics. 
D2  is an interruption  that  breaks  the  flow of D1  and  is 
distinct from D 1. 
DI:  John came by 
and left the groceries 
D2:  Stop that 
you kids 
DI:  and I put them away 
after he left 
Using  the  theory  described  in  previous  sections,  we 
can  capture  the  above  intuitions  about  the  nature  of 
interruptions  with two slightly different definitions.  The 
strong definition holds for those interruptions  we classify 
as "true interruptions"  and digressions, while the weaker 
form holds for those  that are flashbacks.  The two defi- 
nitions are as follows: 
Strong  definition:  An  interruption  is  a  discourse 
segment  whose  DSP  is  not  dominated  nor  satisfac- 
tion-preceded by the DSP of any preceding segment. 
Weak  definition:  An  interruption  is  a  discourse 
segment  whose  DSP  is  not  dominated  nor  satisfac- 
tion-preceded by the DSP of the immediately preced- 
ing segment. 
Neither  of  the  above  definitions  includes  an  explicit 
mention  of our  intuition  that  there  is  a  "return"  to  the 
interrupted discourse after an interruption.  The return is 
an effect of the normal progress of a conversation.  If we 
assume a  focus space is normally popped from the focus 
stack if and only if a  speaker has satisfied the DSP of its 
corresponding  segment,  then  it  naturally  follows  both 
that  the  focus  space for the  interruption  will  be popped 
after  the  interruption,  and  that  the  focus  space  for  the 
interrupted  segment  will  be  at  the  top  of  the  stack 
because its DSP is yet to be satisfied. 
There are other kinds  of discourse  segments that  one 
may want to consider in light of the interruption  contin- 
uum and these definitions.  Clarification dialogues  (Allen 
1979)  and debugging explanations (Sidner  1983)  are two 
such possibilities.  Both of them, unlike  the interruptions 
discussed here, share a DSP with their preceding segment 
and thus do not conform to our definition of interruption. 
These kinds of discourses may constitute another general 
class  of  discourse  segments  that,  like  interruptions,  can 
be abstractly defined. 
5.2  TYPE 1: TRUE INTERRUPTIONS 
The  first  kind  of  interruption  is  the  true  interruption, 
which follows the strong definition of interruptions.  It is 
exemplified  by  the  interruption  given  in  the  previous 
subsection.  Discourses  D1  and  D2  have  distinct,  unre- 
lated  purposes  and  convey  different  information  about 
properties, objects, and relations.  Since D2 occurs within 
D1,  one  expects  the  discourse  structures  for  the  two 
segments to be somehow embedded as well.  The theory 
described  in  this  paper differs  from Polanyi  and  Scha's 
(1984;  and  other  more  radically  different  proposals  as 
well;  e.g., Linde and Goguen  1978,  Cohen  1983,  Reich- 
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man-Adar 1984) because the "embedding" occurs only in 
the  attentional  structure.  As  shown  in  Figure  8,  the 
focus space  for D2  is  pushed  onto  the  stack  above  the 
focus  space  for  D1,  so  that  the  focus  space  for  D2  is 
more salient than the one for D 1, until D2 is completed. 
The  intentional  structures  for  the  two  segments  are 
distinct.  There  are  two DP/DSP structures  for the utter- 
ances  in  this  sequence  -  one  for  those  in  D1  and  the 
other for those in D2.  It is  not necessary to relate  these 
two; indeed, from an intuitive point of view, they are not 
related. 
The focusing structure  for true interruptions  is  differ- 
ent  from  that  for  the  normal  embedding  of  segments, 
because  the  focusing boundary between  the  interrupted 
discourse and the interruption is impenetrable. 12  (This is 
depicted  in  the  figure  by  a  line  with  intersecting  hash 
marks between focus spaces).  The impenetrable bounda- 
ry between the focus spaces prevents entities in the spac- 
es below the boundary from being available to the spaces 
above it.  Because  the  second discourse  shifts  attention 
totally to a  new purpose (and may also shift the identity 
of  the  intended  hearers),  the  speaker  cannot  use  any 
DISCOURCESEGMENTS  FOCUSSPACESTACK  DOMINANCE  HIERARCHY 
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Figure  8.  The structures of a true interruption. 
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referential  expressions  during  it  that  depend  on  the 
accessibility of entities from the first discourse.  Since the 
boundary between  the  focus space  for D1  and  the  one 
for D2 is  impenetrable,  if D2  were  to  include  an  utter- 
ance such as put them  away,  the  pronoun would have to 
refer deictically, and not anaphorically, to the groceries. 
In  this  sample  discourse,  however,  D1  is  resumed 
almost immediately.  The pronoun them in and I put them 
away cannot refer to the children (the focus space for D2 
has  been  popped  from  the  stack),  but  only  to  the 
groceries.  For this to be clear to the OCP, the ICP must 
indicate a return to D 1 explicitly.  One linguistic indicator 
in  this  example  is  the  change of mood from imperative. 
Indicators that  the  stop  that  utterance  is  an  interruption 
include the change to imperative mood and the use of the 
vocative (Polanyi and Scha 1983).  Two other indicators 
may be assumed to have been present at the time of the 
discourse  -  a  change  of  intonation  (imagine  a  slightly 
shrill  tone of command with  an  undercurrent  of annoy- 
ance)  and  a  shift  of gaze  (toward  and  then  away from 
the kids).  It is also possible that the type of pause pres- 
ent  in  such  cases  is  evidence  of  the  interruption,  but 
further  research  is  needed  to  establish  whether  this  is 
indeed the case. 
In contrast to previous accounts, we are not forced to 
integrate  these  two discourses into  a  single  grammatical 
structure,  or  to  answer  questions  about  the  specific 
relationship  between  segments  D2  and  D1,  as  in 
Reichman's model (Reichman-Adar 1984).  Instead, the 
intuition  that  readers  have  of  an  embedding  in  the 
discourse structure is captured in the attentional state by 
the stacking of focus spaces.  In addition, a reader's intui- 
tive impression of the distinctness of the two segments is 
captured  in  their  different  intentional  (DP/DSP)  struc- 
tures. 
5.3  TYPE 2:  FLASHBACKS AND FILLING IN MISSING PLACES 
Sometimes  an  ICP  interrupts  the  flow  of  discussion 
because some purposes,  propositions, or objects need to 
be brought into the discourse but have not been: the ICP 
forgot to include those entities  first,  and so must now go 
back  and  fill  in  the  missing  information.  A  flashback 
segment occurs at that point in the discourse.  The flash- 
back is defined as a segment whose DSP satisfaction-pre- 
cedes the interrupted segment and is dominated by some 
other segment's DSP.  Hence, it is a  specialization of the 
weak  definition  of  interruptions.  This  type  of  inter- 
ruptio  n  differs from true  interruptions  both intentionally 
and linguistically:  the  DSP  for the  flashback bears  some 
relationship  to  the  DP  for  the  whole  discourse.  The 
linguistic  indicator  of the  flashback  typically includes  a 
comment about something going wrong.  In addition the 
audience  always  remains  the  same,  whereas  it  may 
change for a  true  interruption  (as in the example of the' 
previous section). 
In the example below, taken from Sidner  (1982),  the 
ICP  is  instructing  a  mock-up  system  (mimicked  by  a 
person) about how to define and display certain informa- 
tion  in  a  particular  knowledge-representation  language. 
Again the interruption is indicated by italics. 
OK. Now how do I say that Bill is 
Whoops I forgot about ABC. 
I  need an individual concept for the company ABC 
...[remainder of discourse segment on ABC]... 
Now back to Bill.  How do I say that Bill is an employee 
of ABC? 
The  DP  for  the  larger  discourse  from  which  this 
sequence was taken is to provide information about vari- 
ous  companies  (including  ABC)  and  their  employees. 
The outer segment in this example -  DBill -  has a  DSP - 
DSPBill  -  to  tell  about  Bill,  while  the  inner  segment  - 
DAB C  -- has a  DSP  -  DSPAB C  -- to  convey certain infor- 
mation about ABC.  Because of the  nature  of the  infor- 
mation being told, there is order in the final structure of 
the DP/DSPs: information about ABC must be conveyed 
before all of the information about Bill  can be.  The ICP 
in this instance does not realize this constraint until after 
he  begins.  The  "flashback"  interruption  allows  him  to 
satisfy  DSPAB C  while  suspending  satisfaction  of  DSPBill 
(which he then resumes).  Hence, there is  an intentional 
structure  rooted at  DP  and  with  DSPAB C  and  DSPBi u  as 
ordered  sister  nodes.  The  following  three  relationships 
hold between the different DSPs:14 
DP DOM DSPAB  C 
DP DOM DSPBill 
DSPAB  C SP DSPBill 
This kind of interruption  is  distinct from a  true  inter- 
ruption because there is a  connection, although indirect, 
between  the  DSPs  for  the  two  segments.  Furthermore, 
the  linguistic  features  of  the  start  of  the  interruption 
signify that there is a  precedence relation between these 
DSPs (and hence that the correction is necessary).  Flash- 
backs  are  also  distinct  from  normally  embedded 
discourses  because  of  the  precedence  relationship 
between the DSPs for the two segments and the order in 
which the segments occur. 
The  available  linguistic  data  permit  three  possible 
attentional  states  as  appropriate  models  for  flashback- 
type interruptions: one is identical to the state that would 
ensue  if the  flashback segment were a  normally embed- 
ded  segment,  the  second resembles  the  model of a  true 
interruption,  and  the  third  differs  from  the  others  by 
requiring an auxiliary stack. An example of the stack for 
a normally embedded sequence is given in Section 4.2 
Figure 9 illustrates the last possibility. The focus space 
for  the  flashback  -  FSAB  C  --  is  pushed  onto  the  stack 
after  an  appropriate  number  of  spaces,  including  the 
focus  space  for  the  outer  segment  -  FSBill ,  have  been 
popped from the main stack and pushed onto an auxiliary 
stack.  All of the entities in the focus spaces remaining on 
the main stack are normally accessible for reference, but 
none of those on the auxiliary stack are.  In the example 
in the figure, entities  in the spaces from FS  A to FS  B are 
accessible  as  well  (though  less  salient  than)  those  ir/ 
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space FSAB C.  Evidence  for this  kind  of stack behavior 
could  come  from  discourses  in  which  phrases  in  the 
segment about ABC could refer to entities represented in 
FSB, but not to those in FSBi  u or FS C.  After an explicit 
indication that there is a  return to DSPBill (e.g., the  Now 
back  to Bill used in this example), any focus spaces left 
on the  stack from the  flashback are popped off, and  all 
spaces  on  the  auxiliary  stack  (including  FSBill )  are 
returned  to  the  main  stack.  Note,  however,  that  this 
model  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  a  return  to 
some  space  between  FS A  and  FS B  before  popping  the 
auxiliary stack.  Whether there are discourses that include 
such a return  and are deemed coherent is an open ques- 
tion. 
The  auxiliary stack  model  differs  from the  other two 
models  by  the  references  permitted  and  by  the  spaces 
that can be popped to.  Given the initial configuration in 
Figure  9,  if  the  segment  with  DSPAB C  were  normally 
embedded, FSAB C would just be added to the top of the 
stack. If it were a true interruption,  the space would also 
'be added to the stack, but with an impenetrable bounda- 
ry between it and FSBill.  In the normal stack model, enti- 
ties in the spaces lower in the stack would be accessible; 
in the true interruption they would not. In either of these 
two models, however, FSBill would be the space returned 
to  first.  The  auxiliary  stack  model  is  obviously  more 
complicated than the other two alternatives.  Whether it 
(or some equivalent alternative)  is necessary depends on 
facts of discourse behavior that have not yet been deter- 
mined. 
5.4  TYPE  3:  DIGRESSIONS 
The third type of interruption, which we call a digression, 
is defined  as a  strong interruption  that  contains  a  refer- 
ence to some entity that is salient in both the interruption 
and  the  interrupted  segment.  For  example,  if  while 
discussing Bill's role in company ABC, one conversational 
participant interrupts with, Speaking of Bill,  that reminds 
me,  he came to dinner last  week, Bill remains salient,  but 
the  DP  changes.  Digressions  commonly  begin  with 
phrases  such  as  speaking  of John  or  that  reminds  me, 
although no cue phrase need be present, and that reminds 
me may also signal other stack and intention shifts. 
In  the  processing  of  digressions,  the  discourse-level 
intention  of the  digression  forms the  base of a  separate 
intentional  structure,  just  as  in  the  case  of  true  inter- 
ruptions.  A  new focus space is formed and pushed onto 
the stack, but it contains at least one -  and possibly other 
-  entities  from  the  interrupted  segment's  focus  space. 
Like the flashback-type interruption,  the digression must 
usually  be  closed  with  an  explicit  utterance  such  as 
getting back to ABC... or anyway. 
MAIN 
STACK 
FSBILL 
FS  C 
FS B 
FS A 
MAIN  AUXILIARY 
STACK  STACK 
FSAB c 
FS B 
FS A 
FSBI LL 
FS c 
time 
STACK AT t I  STACKS AT t 2 
Figure  9. The auxiliary stack model for flashbacks. 
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5.5  NONINTERRUPTIONS -  "SEMANTIC RETURNS" 
One case of discourse behavior that we must distinguish 
comprises the  so-called  "semantic returns"  observed by 
Reichman  (1981)  and  discussed  by  Polanyi  and  Scha 
(1983).  In all  the  interruptions  we  have  considered so 
far,  the  stack  must  be  popped  when  the  interruption  is 
over and the interrupted discourse is resumed. The focus 
space for the interrupted segment is "returned to." In the 
case of semantic returns, entities and DSPs that were sali- 
ent  during  a  discourse  in  the  past  are  taken  up  once 
again,  but  are  explicitly  reintroduced.  For  example, 
suppose that  yesterday two people  discussed  how badly 
Jack was behaving at the party; then today one  of them 
says  Remember  our  discussion  about  Jack  at  the  party? 
Well, a  lot of other people thought he acted just as badly as 
we thought he did.  The utterances today recall, or return 
to, yesterday's conversation to help satisfy the  intention 
that more be said about Jack's poor behavior. 
Anything that can be talked about once can be talked 
about again.  However, if there is no focus space on the 
stack  corresponding  to  the  segment  and  DSP  being 
discussed further, then, as Polanyi and Scha (1983) point 
out, there is no popping of the stack.  There need not be 
any discourse underway when a  semantic return  occurs; 
in such cases, the focus stack will be empty. Thus, unlike 
the  returns  that  follow  normal 
returns  involve  a  push  onto  the 
containing,  among  other  things, 
reintroduced entities. 
interruptions,  semantic 
stack  of  a  new  space 
representations  of  the 
The  separation  of  attentional  state  from  intentional 
structure makes clear not only what is  occurring in such 
cases, but also the intuitions underlying the term seman- 
tic return.  In reintroducing some entities from a previous 
discourse,  conversational  participants  are  establishing 
some  connection between  the  DSP  of the  new  segment 
and the intentional structure of the original discourse.  It 
is  not  a  return  to  a  previous  focus  space  because  the 
focus  space  for the  original  discourse  is  gone  from  the 
stack,  and the items to be referred to must be re-establ- 
ished  explicitly.  For  example,  the  initial  reference  to 
Jack  in  the  preceding  example  cannot be  accomplished 
with  a  pronoun;  with  no  prior  mention  of  Jack  in  the 
current  discussion,  one  cannot  say,  Remember  our 
discussion  about  him  at  the  party.  The  intuitive 
impression of a  return in the strict sense is only a  return 
to a previous intentional structure. 
6  APPLICATION OF THE THEORY: CUE WORDS 
Both  attentional  state  and  intentional  structure  change 
during  a  discourse.  ICPs  rarely  change  attention  by 
directly and explicitly referring to attentional  state  (e.g., 
using the phrase Now let's turn our attention  to...).  Like- 
wise,  discourses  only  occasionally  include  an  explicit 
reference to a  change in purpose (e.g., with an utterance 
such  as  Now  I  want  to  explain  the  theory  of  dynamic 
programming).  More  typically,  ICPs  employ  indirect 
means  of  indicating  that  a  change  is  coming  and  what 
kind  of  change  it  is.  Cue  phrases  provide  abbreviated, 
indirect means of indicating these changes. 
In all  discourse  changes,  the  ICP must  provide infor- 
mation  that  allows  the  OCP  to  determine  all  of  the 
following: 
1.  that a change of attention is imminent; 
2.  whether the change returns to a  previous focus space 
or creates a new one; 
3.  how the intention is related to other intentions; 
4.  what precedence relationships, if any, are relevant; 
5.  what intention is entering into focus. 
Cue  phrases  can  pack  in  all  of this  information,  except 
for (5).  In this section, we explore the predictions of our 
discourse  structure  theory about  different  uses  of these 
phrases  and  the  explanations  the  theory offers for their 
various roles. 
We  use  the  configuration  of  attentional  state  and 
intentional structure illustrated  in Figure  10 as the start- 
ing point of our analysis.  In the initial configuration, the 
focus space stack has a  space with DSP X  at the bottom 
and another space with DSP A  at the top. The intentional 
structure  includes  the  information  that  X  dominates  A. 
From this  initial  configuration,  a  wide  variety of moves 
may be  made.  We examine  several changes and  the  cue 
phrases  that  can  indicate  each  of  them.  Because  these 
phrases  and  words  in  isolation  may  ambiguously  play 
either discourse or other functional roles, we also discuss 
the  other uses  whenever appropriate.  Furthermore,  cue 
phrases do not function unambiguously with respect to a 
particular discourse role.  Thus for example, first can be 
used for two different moves that we discuss below. 
First, consider what happens when the ICP shifts to a 
new DSP, B, that is dominated by A  (and corresponding- 
ly by X).  The dominance relationship between A  and B 
becomes part  of  the  intentional  structure.  In  addition, 
the change in DSP results in a  change in the focus stack. 
The  focus stack models  this  change,  which  we  call  new 
dominance, by a  having new space pushed onto the stack 
with B  as the DSP of that space  (as illustrated  in Figure 
11).  The space containing A  is salient,  but less so than 
the space with B.  Cue phrase(s)  to signal this case,  and 
only this one, must communicate two pieces of informa- 
tion: that there is a  change to some new purpose (result- 
ing in a  new focus space being created in the attentional 
state model rather than a return to one on the stack) and 
that  the  new  purpose  (DSP  B)  is  dominated by DSP  A. 
Typical cue phrases for this kind of change are for exam- 
ple and to wit, and sometimes first and second. 
Cue phrases  can also exhibit  the  existence of a  satis- 
faction-precedence relationship.  If B  is to be the first in 
a  list  of DSPs dominated by A, then words such as first 
and  in  the first place  can  be  used  to  communicate  this 
fact.  Later in the discourse, cue phrases such as second, 
third,  and finally  can  be  used  to  indicate  DSPs  that  are 
dominated by A  and satisfaction-preceded by B.  In these 
cases,  the  focus  space  containing  B  would  be  popped 
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from the  stack  and the  new focus space inserted  above 
the one containing A. 
There are three other kinds of discourse segments that 
change the intentional  structure  with a  resulting push of 
new  focus  spaces  onto  the  stack:  the  true-interruption, 
where B  is not dominated by A;  the flashback, where B 
satisfaction-precedes  A;  and  the  digression,  where  B  is 
not  dominated  by  A,  but  some  entity  from  the  focus 
space  containing  A  is  carried  over  to  the  new  focus 
space. 
One would expect that there might be cue phrases that 
would distinguish among all four of these kinds of chang- 
es.  Just that is so.  There are cue phrases that announce 
one  and  only  one  kind  of  change.  The  cue  phrases 
mentioned  above for new dominance  are never used for 
the three kinds of discourse interruption pushes.  The cue 
phrases  for  true-interruptions  express  the  intention  to 
interrupt  (e.g.  Excuse  me a  minute,  or !  must  interrupt) 
while the distinct cue phrase for flashbacks  (e.g.  Oops,  ! 
forgot about  ...)  indicates that something is out of order. 
The  typical  opening  cue  phrases  of  the  digression 
mention  the  entity  that  is  being  carded  forward  (e.g. 
Speaking of John ... or Did you hear about John?). 
DISCOURSE SEGMENTS  FOCUS SPACE STACK  DOMINANCE HIERARCHY 
teN,..~ 4,Uhu 
dU,  QI, p~iL~. 
;t 
/ 
/ 
\ 
xl 
DSP = A 
DSP = X 
X  DOMINATES A 
Figure 10.  An initial discourse structure configuration. 
ATTENTIONAL~TATE  CHANGE  DOMINANCE HIERARCHY 
DSP = A 
DSP = X 
DSP = B 
DSP = A 
DSP = X 
X  DOMINATES A 
A  DOMINATES B 
t I  t 2 
Figure 11. Attentional and intentional structures for a new subsegment. 
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Cue phrases can also exhibit the satisfaction of a DSP, 
and hence  the  completion of a  discourse  segment.  The 
completion of a  segment causes the  current  space to be 
popped  from  the  stack.  There  are  many  means  of 
linguistically  marking  completions.  In  texts,  paragraph 
and chapter boundaries  and explicit  comments (e.g.  The 
End)  are  common.  In conversations, completion can be 
indicated either with cue phrases such as fine or OK 15 or 
with  more  explicit  references  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
intention (e.g.,  That's all for point 2,  or The ayes have it.). 
Most cue phrases that communicate changes to atten- 
tional state announce pops of the focus stack.  However, 
at  least  one  cue  phrase  can  be  construed  to  indicate  a 
push, namely, That reminds me. By itself, this phrase does 
not specify any particular change in intentional structure, 
but  merely  shows that  there  will  be  a  new DSP.  Since 
this is  equivalent to indicating that a  new focus space is 
to be pushed onto the stack, this cue phrase is best seen 
as conveying attentional information. 
Cue  phrases  that  indicate  pops  to  some  other  space 
back in the stack include but anyway,  anyway,  in any case, 
and  now  back  to...  When  the  current  focus  space  is 
popped  from  the  stack,  a  space  already  on  the  stack 
becomes most salient.  From the configuration in Figure 
10,  the  space with A  is  popped from the  stack,  perhaps 
with others, and another space on the stack becomes the 
top of the stack.  Popping back changes the stack without 
creating  a  new  DSP,  or  a  dominance  or  satisfaction- 
precedence  relationship.  The  pop entails  a  return  to  an 
old  DSP;  no change is  effected in  the  intentional  struc- 
ture. 
There  are  cue  phrases,  such  as  now  and  next,  that 
signal a change of attentional state, but do not distinguish 
between the creation of a new focus space and the return 
to an old one.  These words can be used for either move. 
For  example,  in  a  task-oriented  discourse  during  which 
some  task  has  been  mentioned  but  put  aside  to  ask  a 
question, the use of now indicates a change of focus.  The 
utterance  following now,  however, will  either  return  the 
discussion  to  the  deferred  task  or  will  introduce  some 
new task for consideration. 
Note,  finally,  that  a  pop  of  the  focus  stack  may  be 
achieved without the use of cue phrases as in the follow- 
ing fragment of a task-oriented dialogue (Grosz 1974): 
A: One bolt is stuck, i'm trying to use both the pliers and 
the wrench to get it unstuck, but I  haven't had much 
luck. 
E:  Don't use pliers.  Show me what you are doing. 
A: I'm pointing at the bolts. 
E:  Show me the 1/2" combination wrench, please. 
A: OK. 
E:  Good, now show me the 1/2" box wrench. 
A: I already got it loosened. 
The  last  utterance  in  this  fragment  returns  the 
discourse to the discussion of the unstuck bolt.  The pop 
can be inferred only from the content of the main portion 
of the utterance.  The pronoun (or, more accurately, the 
fact that  it  cannot be  referring  to  the  wrench)  is  a  cue 
that a  pop is  needed, but only the reference to the loos- 
ening  action  allows  the  OCP  to  recognize  to  which 
discourse segment this utterance belongs, as discussed by 
Sidner (1979)  and Robinson (1981).  A  summary of the 
uses of cue phrases is given in Figure 12. 
Attentional Change 
(push)  now, next, that reminds me, and, but 
(pop to)  anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to 
(complete)  the end, ok, fine, (paragraph break) 
True interruption 
I must interrupt, excuse me 
Flashbacks 
Oops, I forgot. 
Digressions 
By the way, incidentally, speaking of, 
Did you hear about .... That reminds me 
Satisfaction-precedes 
in the first place, first, second, finally, moreover, 
furthermore 
New dominance 
for example, to wit, first, second, and, moreover, 
furthermore, therefore, finally 
Figure 12. The uses of cue phrases. 
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The  cases  listed  here  do  not  exhaust  the  changes  in 
focus spaces and in the dominance hierarchy that can be 
represented  -  nor have we  furnished  a  set of rules that 
specify  when  cue  phrases  are  necessary.  Additional 
cases, especially special subcases of these, may be possi- 
ble.  When  discourse  is  viewed  in  terms  of  intentional 
structure  and  attentional  state,  it  is  clearer  just  what 
kinds of information linguistic expressions and intonation 
convey  to  the  hearer  about  the  discourse  structure. 
Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  linguistic  expressions  can 
function as cue phrases, as well as sentential connections; 
they  can  tell  the  hearer  about  changes  in  the  discourse 
structure  and  be  carriers  of  discourse,  rather  than 
sentence-level semantic, meaning. 
7  SOME PROPERTIES AND PROBLEMS OF 
DISCOURSE-LEVEL INTENTIONS 
The intentions  that serve as DP/DSPs  are natural exten- 
sions  of the  intentions  Grice  (1969)  considers  essential 
to  developing a  theory  of utterer's  meaning.  There  is  a 
crucial  difference,  however,  between  our  use  of  disc- 
ourse-level  intentions  in  this  paper  (and  the  theory,  as 
developed  so  far)  and  Grice's  use  of  utterance-level 
intentions.  We  are  not  yet  addressing  the  issue  of 
discourse  meaning,  but  are  concerned  with  the  role  of 
Dp/DSPs in determining discourse structure and in speci- 
fying how these intentions can be recognized by an OCP. 
Although the intentional  structure  of a  discourse  plays a 
role  in  determining  discourse  meaning,  the  DP/DSPs  do 
not  in  and  of  themselves  constitute  discourse  segment 
meaning.  The  connection  between  intentional  structure 
and  discourse  meaning is  similar to that  between  atten- 
tional  and  cognitive  states;  the  attentional  state  plays a 
role  in  a  hearer's  understanding  of  what  the  speaker 
means by a  given sequence  of utterances  in  a  discourse 
segment,  but it is not  the  only aspect of cognitive  state 
that contributes to this understanding. 
We  will  draw  upon  some  particulars  of  Grice's defi- 
nition  of  utterer's  meaning  to  explain  DSPs  more  fully. 
His initial definition is as follows: 
U  meant  something  by  uttering  x  is  true  iff  [for 
some audience A]: 
1.  U  intended,  by  uttering  x,  to  induce  a  certain 
response in A 
2.  U intended A  to recognize, at least in part from 
the  utterance  of x,  that  U  intended  to  produce 
that response 
3.  U  intended  the  fulfillment  of  the  intention 
mentioned  in  (2)  to  be  at  least  in  part  A's 
reason  for  fulfilling  the  intention  mentioned  in 
(1). 
Grice  refines  this  definition  to  address  a  number  of 
counterexamples.  The  following  portion  of  his  final 
definition 16 is relevant to this paper: 
By uttering x  U meant that *6p is true iff 
(~tA)(3f  [features  of  the  utterance])  (3c  [ways  of 
correlating f  with utterances17]): 
(a) U uttered x intending 
1.  A to think x possesses f 
2.  A to think f  correlated in way c with ~-ing that p 
3.  A  to think, on the basis of fulfillment of (1) and 
(2) that U intends A to think that U ffs that p 
4.  A  on the basis of fulfillment of (3) to think that 
U ~ks that p 
5.  and  (in  some  cases), A  on  the  basis  of  fulfill- 
ment of (4) himself to ~k that p 
Grice  takes  *~p  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  utterance, 
where *ff is a mood indicator associated with the proposi- 
tional  attitude  q~  (e.g.,  *q~=assert  and  ~k=believe).  He 
considers  attitudes  like  believing  that  ICP  is  a  German 
soldier and intending  to give the ICP a  beer as examples 
of the kinds of ~b-ing that p  that utterance intentions can 
embed.  For  expository purposes,  we  use  the  following 
notation to represent these utterance-level intentions: 
Intend(ICP, Believe(OCP, ICP is a German soldier)) 
Intend(ICP, Intend(OCP, OCP give ICP a beer)) 
To extend Grice's definition to discourses, we replace 
the utterance x  with a  discourse  segment DS, the utterer 
U with the initiator of a  discourse  segment ICP, and the 
audience  A  with  the  OCP.  To  complete this  extension, 
the following problems must be resolved: 
1.  specifying the discourse-level intentions  and attitudes 
that correspond to the  utterance-level intentions  and 
~'s that p; 
2.  identifying  the  kinds  of fs  that  contribute  to  deter- 
mining discourse-level intentions; 
3.  identifying the modes of correlation (the c's) between 
features of the discourse  segments and types of disc- 
ourse-level intentions; 
4.  specifying how  the  discourse-level  intentions  can  be 
recognized by an OCP. 
Although  each of these  issues  is  an unresolved  prob- 
lem in  discourse  theory,  this  paper has  provided  partial 
answers.  The examples presented illustrate  the range of 
discourse-level intentions;  these  intentions  appear to  be 
similar to utterance-level intentions  in kind, but differ in 
that they occur in a  context  in which  several utterances 
may be required to ensure their comprehension and satis- 
faction.  The  features  so  far  identified  as  conveying 
information  about  DSPs  are:  specific  linguistic  markers 
(e.g., cue phrases, intonation),  utterance-level intentions, 
and propositional content of the utterances. We have not 
explored the problem of identifying modes of correlation 
in any detail, but it is clear that those modes that operate 
at the utterance level also function at the discourse level. 
As  discussed  previously,  the  proper  treatment  of  the 
recognition  of  discourse-level  intentions  is  especially 
necessary  for  a  computationally  useful  account  of 
discourse.  At the discourse level, just as at the utterance 
level,  the  intended  recognition  of  intentions  plays  a 
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central  role.  The  DSPs  are  intended  to  be  recognized: 
they  achieve  their  effects,  in  part,  because  the  OCP 
recognizes  the  ICP's intention  for the  OCP  to  ~  that p. 
The  OCP's recognition  of  this  intention  is  crucial  to  its 
achieving  the  desired  effect.  In  Section  4  we  described 
certain constraints on the recognition process. 
7.1  THE BASIC GENERALIZATION 
In  extending  Grice's analysis  to  the  discourse  level,  we 
have  to  consider  not  only  individual  beliefs  and 
intentions,  but  also  the  relationships  among  them  that 
arise  because  of  the  relationships  among  various 
discourse  segments  (and  utterances  within  a  segment) 
and the purposes the  segments serve with respect to the 
entire discourse.  To clarify these relationships,  consider 
an  analogous  situation  with  nonlinguistic  actions. 18  An 
action  may divide  into  several  subactions;  for  example, 
the planting of a rose bush divides into preparing the soil, 
digging a  hole,  placing the  rose  bush  in  the  hole,  filling 
the  rest  of  the  hole  with  soil,  and  watering  the  ground 
around  the  bush.  The  intention  to  perform the  planting 
action  includes  several  subsidiary  intentions  (one  for 
each of the subactions -  namely, to do it). 
In discourse, in a  manner that is analogous to nonlin- 
guistic actions, the DP  (and some DSPs)  includes  several 
subsidiary  intentions  related  to  the  DSPs  it  dominates. 
For purposes of exposition, we will use the term primary 
intention  to  distinguish  the  overall  intention  of  the  DP 
from the subsidiary intentions of the DP.  For example in 
the  movies argument  of  Section  3.1,  the  primary inten- 
tion is for the reader to come to believe that parents and 
teachers  should  keep  children  from  seeing  too  many 
movies; in the task dialogue of Section 3.2, the intention 
is  that  the  apprentice  remove the  flywheel.  Subsidiary 
intentions  include,  respectively,  the  intention  that  the 
reader believe that it is important to evaluate movies and 
the  intention  that  the  expert  help  the  apprentice  locate 
the second setscrew. 
Because  the  beliefs  and  intentions  of  at  least  two 
different participants are involved in discourse, two prop- 
erties  of  the  general-action  situation  (assuming  a  single 
agent performs all actions) do not carry over.  First, in a 
discourse, the ICP intends the OCP to recognize the ICP's 
beliefs about the connections among various propositions 
and  actions.  For  example,  in  the  movies  argument,  the 
reader  (OCP)  is  intended  to  recognize  that  the  author 
(ICP)  believes  some  propositions  provide  support  for 
others;  in the task dialogue the expert (ICP) intends  the 
apprentice  (OCP)  to  recognize  that  the  expert  believes 
the  performance  of  certain  actions  contributes  to  the 
performance of other  actions.  In contrast,  in  the  gener- 
al-action  situation  in  which  there  is  no  communication, 
there is no need for recognition of another agent's beliefs 
about  the  interrelationship  of  various  actions  and 
intentions. 
The  second  difference  concerns  the  extent  to  which 
the  subsidiary  actions  or  intentions  specify  the  overall 
action or intention.  To perform some action,  the  agent 
must  perform  each  of  the  subactions  involved;  by 
performing all of these subactions the agent performs the 
action.  In contrast in  a  discourse,  the  participants  share 
the assumption of discourse sufficiency: it is a  convention 
of the communicative situation that the ICP believes the 
discourse is sufficient to achieve the primary intention of 
the  DP.  Discourse  sufficiency  does  not  entail  logical 
sufficiency or action completeness.  It is not  necessarily 
the case that satisfaction of all of the DSPs is sufficient in 
and of itself for satisfaction of the DP. Rather, there is an 
assumption  that  the  information  conveyed  in  the 
discourse will suffice in conjunction  with other information 
the ICP believes the  OCP has  (or can  obtain)  to allow for 
satisfaction of the primary intention of the DP.  Satisfac- 
tion of all of the DSPs, in conjunction with this additional 
information, is enough for satisfaction of the DP.  Hence, 
in discourse the intentional structure  (the analogue of the 
action hierarchy) need not be complete. 
For example, the propositions expressed in the movies 
essay  do  not  provide  a  logically sufficient  proof  of  the 
claim. The author furnishes information he believes to be 
adequate  for the  reader to  reach the  desired  conclusion 
and  assumes the reader will supplement what is actually 
said with appropriate additional information and reason- 
ing.  Likewise, the task dialogue does not mention all the 
subtasks  explicitly.  Instead,  the  expert  and  apprentice 
discuss  explicitly  only  those  subtasks  for  which  some 
instruction  is  needed  or in  connection  with  which  some 
problem arises. 
To be more concrete, we shall look at the extension of 
the Gricean analysis for two particular cases, one involv- 
ing  a  belief,  the  other  an  intention  to  perform  some 
action.  We shall consider only the simplest situations,  in 
which  the  primary intentions  of the  DP/DSPs  are  about 
either beliefs or actions, but not a mixture.  Although the 
task  dialogue  obviously  involves  a  mixture,  this  is  an 
extremely  complicated  issue  that  demands  additional 
research. 
7.2  THE BELIEF CASE 
In the belief case,  the  primary intention  of the DP is to 
get the OCP to believe some proposition,  say p. Each of 
the discourse segments is also intended to get the OCP to 
believe  a  proposition,  say qi  for  some  i= 1 ..... n  (where 
there are n discourse segments). In addition to the prima- 
ry intention -  i.e., that "the OCP should come to believe p 
-  the  DP  includes  an  intention  that  the  OCP  come  to 
believe each of the qi and, in addition,  an intention  that 
the OCP come to believe the qi provide support for p. We 
can represent this schematically as: 19 
Yi= 1 ..... n Intend(ICP, Believe(OCP,p) A 
Believe(OCP,qi ) A 
Believe(OCP, Supports (p, qlA...Aqn))) 
There are several things to note here.  To begin with, 
the first intention,  (Intend ICP (Believe  (OCP p)), is the 
primary  component  of  the  DSP.  Second,  each  of  the 
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intended  beliefs  in  the  second  conjunct  corresponds  to 
the  primary  component  of  the  DSP  of  some  embedded 
discourse  segment.  Third,  the  supports relation  is  not 
implication.  The OCP is not intended to believe that the 
qi imply p, but rather to believe that the qi in conjunction 
with other facts and rules that the ICP assumes the OCP 
has available or can obtain and thus come to believe are 
sufficient  for  the  OCP  to  conclude  p.  Fourth,  the 
DP/DSP  may only be completely determined  at  the  end 
of the discourse (segment), as we discussed in Section 4. 
Finally,  to  determine  how  the  discourse  segments 
corresponding  to  the  qi  are  related  to  the  one  corre- 
sponding to p, the OCP only has to believe that the ICP 
believes  a  supports  relationship  holds.  Hence,  for  the 
purpose  of recognizing  the  discourse  structure,  it would 
be sufficient for the third clause to be 
... Believe(OCP, Believe(ICP, 
Supports (p, qlA...Aqn))) 
However, the DP of a  belief-case discourse is not merely 
to get the OCP to believe p, but to get the OCP to believe 
p by virtue of believing the qi. That this is so can be seen 
clearly  by  considering  situations  in  which  the  OCP 
already believes p  and is known by the ICP to do so, but 
does  not  have  a  good  reason  for  believing  p.  This  last 
property  of  the  belief  case  is  not  shared  by  the  action 
case. 
There  is  an  important  relationship  between  the 
supports  relation  and  the  dominance  relation  that  can 
hold  between  DP/DSPs;  it  is  captured  in  the  following 
rule (using the same notation as above): 
¥i= 1 ..... n Intend(CP 1, Believe(CP2,p)) A 
Intend(CPp Believe(CP2,qi))  A 
Believe(CPp Supports(p, qlA...Aqn))  ~ 
DOM(Intend(CPp Believe(CP2,p)) 
Intend(CP 1, Believe(CP2,qi))) 
The  implication in  the  forward direction  states  that  if a 
conversational participant  (CPI)  believes that the propo- 
sition p is supported by the proposition qi, and he intends 
another participant  (CP2)  to adopt these beliefs, then his 
intention  that  CP  2 believe p  dominates his intention  that 
CP  2  believe  qi-  Viewed  intuitively,  CPl's  belief  that  qi 
provides support for p, underlies his intention to get CP  2 
to believe p  by getting him to believe qi.  The satisfaction 
of  CP~'s  intention  that  CP  2  should  believe  qi  will  help 
satisfy CP~'s intention that  CP 2 believe p.  This relation- 
ship plays a role in the recognition of DSPs. 
7.3  THE ACTION CASE 
An  analogous  situation  holds  for  a  discourse  segment 
comprising  utterances  intended  to  get  the  OCP  to 
perform some  set  of actions  directed  at  achieving  some 
overall  task  (e.g.,  some  segments  in  the  task-oriented 
dialogue  of  Section  3.2).  The  full  specification  of  the 
DP/DSP contains a generates relation that is derived from 
a relation defined by Goldman (1970).  For this case, the 
DP/DSPs are of the following form: 
¥i= 1 ..... n Intend(ICP, Intend(OCP, Do(A)) A 
Intend(OCP, Do(ai)) A 
Believe(OCP, Believe(ICP, 
Generates(A, alA...Aan)))) 
Each intention to act represented in the second conjunct 
corresponds  to  the  primary intention  of  some  discourse 
segment. 
Like  supports,  the  generates  relation  is  partial  (its 
partiality  distinguishes  it  in  part  from  Goldman's 
relation).  Thus,  the  OCP  is  not  intended  to  believe that 
the ICP believes that performance of a i alone is sufficient 
for performance of A, but rather that doing all of the a i 
and other actions that the OCP can be expected to know 
or figure out constitutes a performance of A.  In the task 
dialogue of Section 3.2, many actions that are essential to 
the task (e.g., the apprentice picking up the Allen wrench 
and applying it correctly to the setscrews) are never even 
mentioned in the dialogue. 
Note that it is unnecessary for the ICP or OCP to have 
a  complete plan r~lating all of the a i to A  at the start of 
the discourse  (or discourse segment). All that is required 
is that, for any given segment, the OCP be able to deter- 
mine  what  intention  to  act  the  segment  corresponds  to 
and  which  other  intentions  dominate  that  intention. 
Finally,  unlike  the  belief  case,  the  third  conjunct  here 
requires  only  that  the  OCP  recognize  that  the  ICP 
believes a  generates relationship  holds.  The OCP can do 
A  by  virtue  of  doing  the  a i  without  coming  himself  to 
believe anything  about the  relationships  between  A  and 
the a i. 
As in the belief case, there is an equivalence that links 
the  generates  relation  among  actions  to  the  dominance 
relation  between  intentions.  Schematically,  it  is  as 
follows: 
¥i= 1 ..... n Intend(CP 1, Intend(CP 2, Do(A))) A 
Intend(CP1, Intend(CP2, Do(ai))) A 
Believe(CPt, Generates(A, alA...Aan))  <  > 
DOM(Intend(CP1, Intend(CP2, Do(A))) 
Intend(CP t, Intend(CP 2, Do(ai)))) 
This equivalence states that, if an agent (CP 1) believes 
that  the  performance  of some action  (ai)  contributes  in 
part to the performance of another action (A), and if CP 1 
intends  for CP 2  to  (intend  to)  do both of these  actions, 
then  his  intention  that  CP  2  (intend  to)  perform  a i  is 
dominated by his intention  that  CP 2  (intend  to)  perform 
A.  Viewed  intuitively,  CP1's  belief  that  doing  a i  will 
contribute  to doing A  underlies  his  intention  to get  CP  2 
to do A  by getting CP 2 to do a i. The satisfaction of CPt's 
intention for CP  2 to do a i will help satisfy CP~'s intention 
for CP 2 to do A. 
So,  for  example,  in  the  task-oriented  dialogue  of 
Section 3.2,  the expert knows that using the wheelpuller 
is a  necessary part of removing the  flywheel.  His inten- 
tion that the  apprentice  intend  to use the  wheelpuUer is 
thus  dominated  by  his  intention  that  the  apprentice 
intend to take off the flywheel.  Satisfaction of the inten- 
tion  to  use  the  wheelpuller  will  contribute  to  satisfying 
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the  intention  to  remove  the  flywheel.  In  general,  the 
action a i does not have to be a necessary action though it 
is in this example (at least if the task is done correctly). 
A  definitive  statement  characterizing  primary  and 
subsidiary  intentions  for  task-oriented  dialogues  awaits 
further research not only in discourse theory, but also in 
the  theory  of  intentions  and  actions.  In  particular,  a 
clearer  statement  of  the  interactions  among  the 
intentions  of  the  various  discourse  participants  (with 
respect  to  both  linguistic  and  nonlinguistic  actions) 
awaits the formulation of a  better theory of cooperation 
and multiagent activity. 
7.4  RHETORICAL  RELATIONS 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  contrast  the  role  of 
DP/DSPs, supports, generates, DOM, and SP in our theo- 
ry  with  the  rhetorical  relations  that,  according  to  a 
number of alternative theories (e.g., Grimes 1975, Hobbs 
1979, Mann and Thompson 1983, Reichman-Adar 1984, 
McKeown 1985), are claimed to underlie discourse struc- 
ture.  Among  the  various  rhetorical  relations  that  have 
been  investigated  are  elaboration,  summarization, 
enablement,  justification,  and  challenge.  Although  the 
theories each identify different specific relations, they all 
use such relations as the basis for determining discourse 
structure. 
These rhetorical relations apply specifically to linguis- 
tic  behavior  and  most  of  them  implicitly  incorporate 
intentions  (e.g., the intention to summarize, the intention 
to justify). The intentions that typically serve as DP/DSPs 
in  our  theory  are  more  basic  than  those  that  underlie 
such rhetorical  relations  in  that  they are  not  specialized 
for  linguistic  behavior;  in  many cases,  their  satisfaction 
can be realized by nonlinguistic actions as well as linguis- 
tic ones. 
The supports and generates relations that must some- 
times be inferred to determine domination are also more 
basic than rhetorical  relations;  they are general relations 
that hold between propositions and actions.  Hence, the 
inferring of relationships  such as supports and generates 
is  simpler  than  that  of  rhetorical  relationships.  The 
determination  of  whether  a  supports  or  generates 
relationship  exists  depends  only  on  facts  of  how  the 
world  is,  not  on  facts of  the  discourse.  In contrast,  the 
recognition of rhetorical relations requires  the  combined 
use of discourse and domain information. 
For  several  reasons,  rhetorical  relationships  do  not 
have  a  privileged  status  in  the  account  given  here. 
Although  they appear to provide a  metalevel description 
of  the  discourse,  their  role  in  discourse  interpretation 
remains  unclear.  As  regards  discourse  processing,  it 
seems  obvious  that  the  ICP  and  OCP  have  essentially 
different access to them.  In particular, the ICP may well 
have  such  rhetorical  relationships  "in  mind"  as  he 
produces  utterances  (as  in  McKeown's  (1985)  system), 
whereas  it  is  much  less  clear  when  (if  at  all)  the  OCP 
infers them. A claim of the theory being developed in this 
paper is  that  a  discourse  can  be  understood  at  a  basic 
level  even  if  the  OCP  never  does  or  can  construct,  let 
alone name,  such  rhetorical  relationships.  Furthermore, 
it  appears  that  these  relationships  could  be  recast  as  a 
combination  of  domain-specific  information,  general 
relations between propositions and actions (e.g., supports 
and generates), and general relations between intentions 
(e.g.,  domination  and  satisfaction-precedence). 20  Even 
so, rhetorical relationships  are, in all likelihood, useful to 
the  theoretician  as  an  analytical  tool for certain  aspects 
of discourse analysis. 
8  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The theory of discourse structure presented in this paper 
is a  generalization of theories of task-oriented dialogues. 
It differs from previous generalizations in that it carefully 
distinguishes  three  components  of  discourse  structure: 
one linguistic,  one intentional,  and  one  attentional.  This 
distinction  provides  an  essential  basis  for  explaining 
interruptions, cue phrases, and referring expressions. 
The  particular  intentional  structure  used  also  differs 
from  the  analogous  aspect  of  previous  generalizations. 
Although,  like those generalizations,  it supplies the  prin- 
cipal  framework  for  discourse  segmentation  and  deter- 
mines  structural  relationships  for  the  focusing  structure 
(part  of the  attentional  state),  unlike  its  predecessors  it 
does  not  depend  on  the  special  details  of  any  single 
domain or type of discourse. 
Although  admittedly  still  incomplete,  the  theory does 
provide a  solid  basis for investigating  both  the  structure 
and  meaning  of  discourse,  as  well  as  for  constructing 
discourse-processing  systems.  Several  difficult  research 
problems  remain  to  be  explored.  Of  these,  we  take  the 
following to be of primary importance: 
1.  Specification  of  the  relationship  between  discourse- 
level (DP/DSP) and utterance-level intentions; 
2.  Identification of the information that discourse partic- 
ipants use to recognize these intentions,  and the ways 
in which they utilize it; 
3  Development of an  adequate  treatment  of the  inter- 
action among intentions of multiple participants; 
4.  Investigation  of  the  effect  of  multiple  DSPs  on  the 
theory; 
5.  Investigation  of  alternative  models  of  attentional 
state. 
Finally,  the  theory suggests several important  conjec- 
tures.  First,  that  a  discourse  is  coherent  only  when  its 
discourse  purpose  is  shared  by  all  the  participants  and 
when  each  utterance  of  the  discourse  contributes  to 
achieving  this  purpose,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  by 
contributing  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  discourse  segment 
purpose.  Second, general intuitions  about "topic" corre- 
spond most closely to DP/DSPs,  rather than to syntactic 
or attentional concepts.  Finally, the theory suggests that 
the  same intentional  structure  can  give rise  to  different 
attentional  structures  through  different  discourses.  The 
different  attentional  structures  will  be  manifest  in  part 
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because different referring expressions will be valid, and 
in part because different cue phrases and other indicators 
will be necessary, optional, or redundant. 
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NOTES 
1.  The use of the  phrase "linguistic structure" to refer to the struc- 
ture of sequences of utterances is a  natural extension of its use in 
traditional  linguistic theories to refer to the syntactic structure of 
individual  sentences.  To  avoid  confusion the  phrase  "linguistic 
structure" will be used in this paper only to refer to the structure 
of a  sequence  of  utterances composing a  discourse or discourse 
segment. 
2.  Mann has also reported that  the  subjects did  not label segments 
nearly so consistently. We believe this fact is related  to the kinds 
of  relations  the  labels  were  dependent  upon.  As  discussed  in 
Section 7.4, there is a difference between the intentional structure 
we describe and the relations that others use. 
3.  Referring expressions can also be used to mark a discourse bound- 
ary.  For example, novelists sometimes use pronouns to indicate a 
new scene in a story. 
4.  These two relations are similar to ones that play a  role in parsing 
at the sentence level:  immediate dominance and linear precedence. 
However,  the  dominance  relation,  like  the  one  in  Marcus  and 
Hindle's D-theory (Marcus et al.  1983),  is partial (i.e., nonimme- 
diate). 
5.  Even in the  task case the orderings may be partial.  In fact,  the 
systems built for task-oriented dialogues (Robinson 1981,  Walker 
1978) did not use a prebuilt tree, but constructed the tree -  based 
on a partially-ordered model -  only as a given discourse evolved. 
6.  The observant reader will  note that  this was written in the  early 
days of the cinema, before the advent of sound; hence the quota- 
tion marks around "movies." Note also that utterance (7) contains 
a  somewhat odd  preposition,  and  utterance  (16)  somewhat odd 
definite noun phrases.  We have quoted the text exactly as it was 
printed. 
7.  The segmentation omits some levels of detail.  For example, utter- 
ances  19-24  are  a  segment within DSS.  Rather than present this 
detail,  we concentrate on the larger segments here so as to focus 
on the major issues with which this paper is concerned. 
8.  This modification "folds in" an informing action with the request. 
Such combining of two types of speech acts is similar to the action 
subsumption that  Appelt  (1985)  discusses in  regard  to  referring 
expressions. 
9.  Hirschberg and  Pierrehumbert  (1986)  have  shown recently  that 
intonational features, most notably pitch range, can  also be used 
to indicate discourse segment boundaries. 
10.  We  assume here  that  the  OCP  must recognize  intentions  rather 
than actions.  The  argument that  such is the  case  is  beyond the 
scope  of  this  paper.  At  a  very  general  level,  it  centers  on  the 
possibility that  the  very same sequence of utterance  actions  will 
correspond to  two different  discourse structures with the  differ- 
ence statable only in terms of the ICP's intentions.  The possibility 
of  such  sequences  was  suggested  to  us  by  Michael  Bratman 
[personal communication]. The irony contained in such a clause as 
you're a real sweetheart illustrates the need to consider intentions. 
11.  This  knowledge may be  available  prior to the  discourse or from 
information supplied by previous utterances in the discourse. 
12.  This boundary is clearly  atypical of stacks.  It suggests that  ulti- 
mately the stack model is not quite what is needed.  What struc- 
ture should replace the stack remains unclear to us. 
13.  Because this is so clearly the case on other grounds, the segment 
boundary is obvious even to a reader after the fact. 
14.  From just  the  fragment presented,  all  that  can  be determined  is 
that the two dominates relationships are domination but not direct 
domination. 
15.  OK is many ways ambiguous.  It may also mean (at least) I  heard 
what you said, !  heard and intend to do what you intend me to intend, 
1 am done what I  undertook to do, or I  approve what you are about to 
do. 
16.  This portion is taken from Redefinition IVB: a further redefinition 
deals  with  abstracting  about  audience  and  would  unnecessarily 
complicate our initial  view of intentions and discourse. 
17.  Grice  (1969)  mentions  iconic,  conventional,  and  associative 
modes, giving examples of each. 
18.  This analogy is meant to help clarify and motivate the discussion. 
Although it  also  suggests some  important  problems in  common 
between research on discourse and research on theories of action 
and intention, those issues are the subject of another paper. 
19.  Here  again  we  use  a  notational  shorthand rather  than  a  formal 
language to make some of the relationships clearer. 
20.  This claim  reflects a  move analogous to the  one made by Cohen 
and  Levesque  (1985)  in  showing that  the  definitions  of  various 
speech acts can be derived  as lemmas within a  general theory of 
rational behavior. 
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